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Anticipation and Adaptation in Particulate Matter Policy: 
The European Union, the Netherlands, and United States 
 
1. Joint Introduction and Summary 
 
The evolution of particulate matter (PM) air quality policy in the European Union and in the 
United States between 1970 and the present has been atypical. The US government and the 
European Commission have mandated scheduled reviews of PM policy over the past three 
decades and have updated that policy to new scientific information on multiple occasions. 
The use of planned adaptation over such a long period and in this manner, as a means to 
deal with uncertainty, has not often been reproduced in air quality policy. 
Furthermore, particulate matter policy in the EU and US does not conform to the 
commonly held perception that the EU’s environmental policies are, by and large, more 
precautionary than the respective policies in the United States. The US decisions to adopt air 
quality standards for PM10 and PM2.5, in 1987 and 1997 respectively, led those in the EU by 
approximately nine years.1 An analysis of the comparative stringency of the PM standards in 
the US and EU shows that the PM2.5 standard the US implemented in 1997 is more stringent 
than the standards that have been proposed in the EU by the European Commission and the 
European Parliament. In September this year, the US repealed their annual standard for 
PM10. Prior to that, however, the annual PM10 standard the EU implemented in 1999 was 
more stringent than the one the US adopted in 1987. The daily PM10 standards in the EU 
and US are of similar stringency. In the Appendix, these comparisons in stringency are 
discussed in more detail.  
The differences between the EU and US policies are remarkable because they are 
based on the same science and therefore reflect dissimilar processes of interpreting that 
science and the uncertainties inherent in it. The two cases themselves focus on the science-
policy interfaces for their respective governing bodies. The EU case also looks at the 
science-policy interface in the Netherlands. The US case also examines policies for sulfur 
dioxides that relate to the PM policies. The remainder of this summary discusses how 
characteristics of the science-policy interfaces may have led to the differences in outcomes. 
                                                 
1 PM10 refers to particulate matter with mean aerodynamic diameter less than 10 microns and PM2.5 refers to PM with 
mean aerodynamic diameter less than 2.5 microns. The EU decision to set standards for PM10 was made in 1996 when 
the EU air quality Framework Directive was adopted. The precise standards were set in 1999. The EU has not yet 
formally decided to regulate PM2.5, but the European Commission proposed a standard in 2005 and the European 
Parliament proposed another standard in 2006. Whatever the precise outcome of the negotiation process between the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, the decision has now effectively been taken to regulate PM2.5. The 
US set PM10 standards in 1987 and set PM2.5 standards in 1997. They recently made those PM2.5 standards more 
stringent in September of 2006 and repealed one of the two PM10 standards in the US.  
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1.a. The difficulty of anticipation 
The cases identify a number of factors that influence the success of anticipation and 
adaptation as means for dealing with uncertainty when developing policy. Similar factors 
influence both anticipation and adaptation. For example high-quality knowledge assessments 
increase the likelihood that both will succeed, as do incentives to surface information. The 
transparency of processes and models may also influence both. 
Table I shows examples in which the costs, benefits, or effectiveness of policies were 
anticipated prior to the implementation the policy. As one would expect, attempts at 
anticipation of outcomes were not perfect – although the range of success varied 
considerably.  
In the US Acid Rain Program, a lack of saliency in knowledge assessment 
contributed to the severe misanticipation of the program’s benefits. In the US air quality 
standards cases, the benefits and costs are not estimated prior to implementation because the 
Clean Air Act does not allow their consideration. However one can say, for example, that the 
health benefits or effectiveness of limiting PM10 with an annual standard were less than 
expected because the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently repealed that 
standard. The misanticipation in the case of PM10 was caused by the uncertainties in the 
science about PM’s health impacts. Those uncertainties still exist, as scientists are not sure 
that particles between 2.5 and 10 µm in diameter have no effect on health. The EPA did not 
revoke its daily standard for PM10, which is more stringent than was its annual PM10 
standard.   For similar reasons, both the US and EU stopped regulating total suspended 
particulates (TSP) when scientific studies showed that smaller particles were responsible for 
the majority of the PM’s health impacts.  
The case of building projects in the Netherlands provides an example where 
misanticipation was even more extreme. The Netherlands chose a more strict interpretation 
of the EU air quality limit values than did many other EU countries.2 The Netherlands also 
required the use of detailed modeling to help predict the impact of construction projects on 
air quality. Policymakers did not initially consider the high economic costs of this strict 
interpretation of the EU air quality limit values, and they did not foresee the strict way in 
which the judiciary would actually enforce the air quality order of 2001. They are now 
reconsidering their method of interpretation of the standards. The misanticipation in this 
case was the failure to anticipate the high economic and social costs of the policy.  
1.b. Examples of adaptation 
These cases are examples of why a strategy of adaptation is needed as a means of dealing 
with uncertainty: the anticipation of the effects, benefits, and costs of policies are often 
incorrect. If adaptation does not occur, policies remain designed around initial, unavoidably 
incorrect, anticipation of outcomes. This can carry high social costs, either in the form of 
                                                 
2 Sweden being the only EU country with an interpretation that was even more strict than that of the Netherlands. 
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excessive cost burdens (as in the case of building projects in the Netherlands) or in the form 
of forgone health benefits (as in the case of the Acid Rain Program in the United States). 
Anticipation will always be needed because even when adapting a policy, uncertainties will 
persist. These reasons make an iterative process a desirable outcome. 
 
Unexpected
EXAMPLE CASE Overstated Materialized Understated
Acid Rain Program
U.S. TSP Air Qual. Stndrds*
EU TSP Air Qual. Stndrds*
U.S. PM10 Air Qual. Stndrds*
U.S. PM2.5 Air Qual. Stndrds* Costs
Netherlands building prjtcs Benefits Costs
* Not explicitly calculated, but effectiveness of the policies were expected none-the-less
TABLE I: The location of the anticipated costs, benefits, or effectiveness of policies on a 
spectrum of expected to unexpected. If the effects where anticipated, they are also placed on a 
spectrum of overstated to correctly predicted (materialized) to understated.
Expected
BenefitsCosts     
Benefits     
Benefits     
Benefits     
        Benefits
 
The comparison of the EU and US PM air quality cases reveals similarities and 
differences. Both have used adaptation to adjust policies as the science about the health 
impacts of particulate matter progressed. One difference between these cases is that the US 
led the EU in adopting new standards, as shown in the timeline in Figure 1. Another 
difference is that the US PM2.5 standard is more stringent than the one the EU is currently 
considering. Another is that the EU annual standard for PM10 is more stringent than the 
annual standard for PM10 that was in place in the US until September 21, 2006.  
 
Figure 1: Timelines of EU and US particulate matter decisions 
 
Formally structured knowledge assessment commenced
EU PM
Limit Values 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
1980
First EC Directive
TSP  Standard
1999
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Daughter Directive
PM10 Standard
1970
U.S. PM
Air Quality
Standards
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
1971
Clean Air Act
TSP Standard
1979 1987
PM10 Standard 
Second ReviewFirst review
1997
PM2.5 Standard
2006
New PM 2.5 Standard
Third Review
2005
Proposed
PM2.5 Standard
2001
CAFE
1996EU Framework DirectiveAnnounced PM10 Standard
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1.c. Similarities between the EU and US air quality decisions for 
particulate matter  
The US and EU rely on the same science to make decisions about air quality standards. This 
science includes both toxicological and epidemiological studies about the impact of PM on 
public health. The body of science has dramatically increased since the early 1990s. The 
epidemiological studies have provided the majority of evidence that there is a connection 
between the smaller particles and detrimental health impacts including things like asthma and 
cardiovascular disease. There still remains considerable uncertainty about the mechanisms of 
the connection between small PM and health effects that the epidemiological studies 
observe. 
 Beyond relying on the same body of science to support air quality decisions, the US 
and EU cases are similar in other important ways. For example, both use highly transparent, 
participatory processes to inform policy decisions about relevant science. In the EU case, 
formal procedures for reviewing the standards were put in place after the 1999 decision to 
implement the PM10 standard and the Clean Air for Europe (CAFE) assessment program 
started in 2001. The EU designed CAFE specifically around the goal of providing high 
quality science-policy advice through a transparent knowledge assessment process. The US 
process is also transparent, calls for public comment and input a number of times, and 
includes mandated and scheduled reviews of the standards and the science behind them. 
Interestingly, the EU implemented standards for total suspended particles, PM10, and PM2.5 
about nine years after the US in each case. This suggests that a nine-year period is roughly 
how long these transparent, participatory review processes need to complete a review of an 
air quality standard.    
 
1.d. Differences between the EU and US air quality decisions for 
particulate matter 
The question about why there has been a mismatch in timing between the US and EU 
adoption of PM standards can be posed two ways. First, why have there been lags in the 
adoption of PM standards on the part of the EU? Second, why did the US interpret 
uncertainty more aggressively and adopt new PM standards more quickly than the EU?  
 One reason that may have caused the EU decisions to lag those in the United States 
is that during the 1990s the majority of the influential epidemiological studies were 
performed using cohort data collected in the United States. Decision makers in the EU could 
have felt that some aspects of these studies, like differences in the population, composition 
of the particulate matter, or other aspects of air quality were not representative of the EU. 
However, in 1987 the US decision to adopt PM10 standards relied in part on reanalyses of the 
London fog episodes in the 1950s. These reanalyses were more applicable in the EU than in 
the United States. The US Environmental Protection Agency used other US studies to 
“translate” the London fog studies to US conditions but they did rely on the London fog 
8 
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studies to help them set the upper bound for the standards considered in the 1987 review.3 
Other reasons for the relative slowness in the EU could have been politics that were external 
to decisions about air quality or the opposition of industries in some countries.  
 There are a number of reasons that could help explain why the US has been quicker 
to adopt new PM standards, given the uncertainties, than the EU. First, the Clean Air Act 
does not allow the EPA to consider the costs of adopting air quality standards that protect 
the public health. Second, as explained in the US case study, interest group lawsuits pushed 
the EPA to review the PM standard by a deadline each time they revised it. Although the EU 
did have a mandated, scheduled review procedure in effect since 2001 (the first review was 
completed by the European Commission in 2005), there was not a similar mechanism by 
which interest groups could have pushed the revision of standards, since the review was 
solely under the authority of the Commission.4  
Incentives to surface information are another important influence on these 
processes. In the US, the desire of many different parties to see the US Acid Rain Program 
succeed created strong incentives for information about the health impacts of PM2.5 and 
their connection to sulfur dioxide pollution to surface. The EPA, Congress, and others rely 
on the science backing the PM2.5 air quality standards to maintain that the Acid Rain 
Program has been successful. The Acid Rain Program reduces some forms PM2.5, like 
sulfates, through its reductions in precursor emissions (sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides). 
But, there is still some uncertainty about whether sulfates, for example, are the fraction of 
small PM that damage health the most. The US downplays this uncertainty because of 
incentives to claim that the Acid Rain Program has succeeded. The EU does not have a 
similar incentive, and does not downplay the uncertainty about which fractions of PM are 
the most detrimental to public health.  
1.e. Conclusions 
Setting aside the differences in timing between the US and EU policy decisions on PM air 
quality, the courses of PM policy on both continents are laudable simply because they use 
planned adaptation, and even unplanned or forced adaptation, to help deal with 
uncertainties. As is normal in environmental policy, uncertainties mean that we cannot be 
certain if the US is correct in focusing its attention on smaller and smaller PM particles or in 
believing in a connection between reductions in sulfur dioxides and harmful fractions of PM. 
We also cannot be sure whether the EU or the US has erred. Has the EU forgone health 
benefits by their comparative delays in the implementation of strict PM2.5 standards? Or, has 
the US incurred unnecessary costs? We can only be sure that – because of uncertainties – 
both the US and the EU have made suboptimal decisions, to a small degree at least.  
                                                 
3 See the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s “Criteria Document” cited in the U.S. Case Study as EPA CD 1982. 
4 The review was delayed twice. The deadline set in 1999 was 2003. When the review was subsequently taken up in the 
context of the CAFE program that started in 2001, the new deadline was 2004. The new proposal was only published 
by the Commission in 2005, however, again a year later. 
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The history and institutionalization of planned adaptation in these cases means that 
we can be fairly confident that these suboptimal decisions will be changed again as science 
and policy experimentation create new knowledge. The same cannot be said of other 
environmental policies that share a reliance on uncertain justifications but that have never, 
and likely will never or will rarely, be changed. Despite their imperfections, PM air quality 
policy on both continents provides an example worthy of emulation. The attached case 
studies address some of the challenges that the EU and US PM air quality science-policy 
interfaces confronted to achieve this success. We hope that further work on the case 
comparisons will also, eventually, provide more concrete lessons.  
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Adaptation and Anticipation in EU and Dutch 
Particulate Matter Policies 
 
Arthur Petersen1, Jeroen van der Sluijs2 and Willemijn Tuinstra1
1 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Bilthoven, The Netherlands 
2 Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Development and Innovation, Utrecht University, Utrecht, 
The Netherlands 
 
 
2. Introduction 
 
Ambient particulate matter is air pollution consisting of a complex mixture of particles of 
various diameters and various chemical compositions. Depending on the diameter of the 
particles, either the abbreviation PM10 is used (for particles with a diameter up to 10 
micrometers) or the abbreviation PM2.5 (for particles with a diameter up to 2.5 micrometers). 
Exposure to PM in ambient air has been linked to a number of different health outcomes, 
ranging from modest transient changes in the respiratory tract and impaired pulmonary 
function, through increased risk of symptoms requiring emergency room or hospital 
treatment, to increased risk of death from cardiovascular and respiratory diseases or lung 
cancer. This evidence stems from studies of both acute and chronic exposure, and from 
toxicological studies (see, e.g., WHO 2006). Because of these health risks, the regulation of 
ambient particulate matter has become part of air quality policies across the world. For 
instance, the US and EU are regularly updating their air quality standards for PM on the 
basis of progressing scientific evidence. And cities in Asia are beginning to implement 
command-and-control policies to reduce PM emissions from traffic and industry. 
 On the basis of scientific studies and models, governments prepare air quality 
policies to mitigate the potential health problems associated with particulate matter. The 
policies can be said to anticipate the actual presence of these problems. Anticipation is 
difficult, since the evidence is inconclusive and challenged in the societal debate. For 
instance, in the integrated assessment that precedes European environmental policy making, 
a diverse array of models is used from different disciplines, each having uncertainties 
attached to them. Also at the (sub)national level, the impact of concrete policy proposals on 
air quality is often assessed using models. In the Netherlands, air quality models are used, for 
instance, to assess the impacts of spatial planning projects. Since scientific and policy realities 
may turn out to be different from what was anticipated in the initial formulation of policies, 
a situation may arise in which it becomes desirable to adapt the policies to meet the 
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progressing insights. Such adaptation of policies involves new anticipations, and the new 
policies may again turn out to be subject to subsequent revisions, etc. This marks the 
iterative character of science-based policy making. 
 In this paper, first an overview is given of recent developments of particulate matter 
policies in the EU in general and in the Netherlands, one of the EU countries, in particular 
(section 3). These developments, which are currently culminating in negotations of a PM2.5 
standard, are put in a larger historical context (section 3.a). Also the way the science–policy 
interface is structured in EU policy making on particulate matter is described (section 3.b). 
The questions that prompted this case study – and its companion US case study – 
relate to the notions of anticipation and adaptation. This paper examines instances of 
different types of anticipation and adaptation in EU and Dutch decision making on PM 
(section 4). The following questions on adaptation are dealt with: In what ways can recent the 
policy change with respect to the introduction of a PM2.5 standard be said to be a ‘planned 
adaptation’, that is, to what extent did previous EU policy decisions explicitly keep open the 
possibility that new scientific information available at a scheduled review date could lead to 
changes in PM standards, including the introduction of a PM2.5 standard? (section 4.a.i.) 
What processes other than planned adaptation through scheduled reviews triggered the 2005 
softening of the Dutch air quality order that implements the current EU Directive on PM10? 
(section 4.a.ii) What causes the approximately 9-year delay in EU decision making on PM as 
compared with the US while the science base is the same? (section 4.a.iii). 
Section 4.b focuses on anticipation. First, issues such as the transparency of the modeling 
process and creating credibility for modeling results are touched upon (sections 4.b.i). 
Subsequently, the assessment of knowledge and the treatment of uncertainties in policy 
making are dealt with in more detail, both at the EU level for the setting of standards 
(section 4.b.ii) and at the Dutch level for the implementation of the EU Directive regulating 
PM10 (section 4.b.iii).  
 This paper concludes with a brief discussion (section 5). 
 
3. Background on EU and Dutch Particulate Matter Policies 
3.a. Timeline of Key Decisions 
 
EU policies on emissions and on air quality standards date from the 1980s, but the EU only 
became really active in the field of air pollution policy making in the 1990s. Before the 1990s, 
individual European countries regulated PM in different ways.5 In this paper, we will only 
focus on one country in particular, the Netherlands. 
                                                 
5 Still, EU countries are allowed to implement more stringent norms (see, e.g., Sweden). And, perhaps even more 
important for this study, different countries implement the EU Directives in different ways. 
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Policies concerning emissions of PM and PM precursors 
 1970 — In the Netherlands, the Wet inzake de Luchtverontreiniging (Dutch Clean 
Air Act, WLV) was introduced, a framework law that enables the regulation of polluting 
installations, fuels or activities. Examples of regulatory decisions under the WLV: categories 
of industries to which the WLV applies (1972); sulphur content of fuels (1974); standards for 
primary PM emissions from stoves and multiburners (1996). 
 1976 — Dutch national emission ceiling of 500 kton SO2 (IMP Lucht 1976-1980). 
 1979 — UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. 
 1980 — The Wet milieubeheer (Dutch Environmental Protection Act, WM), which 
is currently the most important Dutch environmental law (also a framework law), was 
introduced. Examples of regulatory decisions under the WM: PM emissions from small 
industrial burners (1990); PM emissions from waste-burning facilities (1993). 
 1985 — UNECE Sulphur Protocol, Helsinki: all countries agreed to a 30% reduction 
of national SO2 emissions. 
 1987 — EU directive regulating the emissions of pollutants, including PM, from 
diesel engines, laying the foundation for later directives (1999, 2001, 2005). Subsequent 
standards (increasingly strict) are introduced by this series of directives: EURO I in 1992, 
EURO II in 1996, EURO III in 2000, EURO IV in 2005 and EURO V in 2008. 
 1988 — EU Large Combustion Plant Directive, setting emission limits for SO2, NOx 
and dust for new and existing plants (revised in 2001, together with appearance of the EU 
National Emission Ceilings Directive, see below). 
 1994 — UNECE Second Sulphur Protocol, Oslo: application of effects-based 
approach; best available technology; application of economic instruments; and critical load 
concept. 
 1999 — UNECE Gothenburg Protocol (a multi-polutant, multi-effect protocol in 
which the mitigating effects on secondary PM are considered as ‘additional benefits’), signed 
by the EU member countries but not by the EU itself. 
 2001 — EU National Emission Ceilings Directive, which regulates the emissions of 
several pollutants (including major PM precursors such as SO2 and NH3) and which is for 
some species more stringent than the 1999 UNECE Gothenburg Protocol. 
 2004 — Change in Dutch tax law to stimulate soot filters in diesel cars. 
 2006 — Example of another type of policy instrument than regulation or tax 
measures: Dutch covenant between national government, city governments and 
organizations from the transport sector on the introduction of ‘environmental zones’ within 
cities, which only ‘clean’ trucks are allowed to enter. 
 
Policies concerning PM air quality standards 
 1980 — The first EC Directive on ambient air quality was adopted by the Council 
(80/779/EEC). Two norms for ‘suspended particles’ (all size fractions included) were 
introduced: at the end of 1983, the 98 percentile of all daily mean values taken throughout 
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the year should not exceed 250 µg/m3 and the median of daily mean values throughout the 
year should not exceed 80 µg/m3. Member States must measure concentrations, and report 
any breaches of the limit values to the European Commission. 
 1996 — In 1996, a harmonisation process between EU countries began with the 
entry into force of the EU Air Quality Framework Directive (1996/62/EC), replacing 
directive 80/779/EEC, among others. This Framework Directive provides a new and 
coherent general European framework for ‘evaluating and managing air quality’. The 
Framework Directive uses a number of important concepts: daughter directives, preliminary 
assessments, assessment thresholds and zones and agglomerations. The daughter directives 
are specifications of air quality requirements for certain substances. In the meantime, four 
daughter directives have appeared. 
 1999 — The first EU daughter directive regulates PM10 (air quality standard), among 
several other air pollution species (1999/30/EC), setting standards that should be met by 
2005 and 2010. In 2005, the annual average EU norm is 40 µg/m3 and the daily average EU 
norm is 50 µg/m3, which may be exceeded 35 times at maximum. The daughter directive 
schedules a review for 2003, keeping open the possibility of adding a PM2.5 norm. PM2.5 
should be measured and reported. 
 2001 — The first daughter directive is implemented in the Netherlands as an Air 
Quality Order (Staatsblad 2001) under the Dutch Clean Air Act in 2001. 
 2005 — The Dutch goverment issues a new Air Quality Order, replacing the one of 
2001. This order contains a more flexible intepretation of the air quality directives: 
subtraction of the natural PM fraction; averaging of air quality over larger areas; no stand-still 
principle (allowing for increasing PM concentrations where they stay under the norm). 
 2005 —  Communication from the European Commission “Thematic Strategy on 
Air Pollution”, the result of the Clean Air for Europe (CAFE) programme and part of the 
Community’s Sixth Environmental Action Programme. Aimed at streamlining existing 
provisions and merging five legal instruments into a single Directive. Proposal to introduce 
new air quality standards for fine PM (PM2.5): PM2.5 limit value of 25 µg/m3 (annual average) 
to be attained in 2010. In the longer term, a 75% concentration reduction is proposed, which 
implies a reduction in primary PM2.5 emissions by 59%.  
 2006 — On March 17, 2006, a legislative proposal was sent to Dutch parliament to 
integrate a large part, including the limit values, of the existing Dutch regulatory decisions 
implementing the EU Directives, such as the 2005 order, into the WM. 
 2006 — The proposed directive that includes a PM2.5 norm is amended by the 
European Parliament. A more strict – but indicative instead of obligatory – target of 20 
µg/m3 (annual average) is proposed, with the explicit possibility to make it obligatory after 
review. 
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3.b. The EU Science–Policy Interface: CAFE program6 
 
The question of how EU policies anticipate uncertain air pollution problems and adapt to 
progressing insights can only be answered by first taking a closer look at the science–policy 
interface. Here we will briefly discuss the EU science–policy interface with a focus on the 
role of models in the Clean Air for Europe (CAFE) program that led to the 2005 Thematic 
Strategy on Air Pollution (European Commission 2001a). 
 CAFE (see also box 1) was developed under the leadership of a permanent 
secretariat housed within the Directorate General Environment of the European 
Commission. A Steering Group composed of about 80 representatives of the Member 
States, the European Parliament, stakeholders and relevant international organisations meet 
two or three times a year. Its mandate was to advise the Commission on the strategic 
direction of the programme rather than on technical issues. It did not have any formal 
decision making power. Nor did any of the other groups in the CAFE program. The 
mandate of the CAFE program was the development of policy guidance, not of the policies 
itself. The CAFE program was situated in the first phase of the development of a European 
legislative policy proposal, the so called ‘expert phase’. This is the phase during which the 
Commission collects information to develop a policy proposal. 
 Furthermore, according to the readers guide to the CAFE work plan (European 
Commission 2001b), ‘the policy guidance to emerge from CAFE needs to be based on an 
integrated assessment of a wide range of policy alternatives, taking account of all relevant 
scientific, technical and political information’. The CAFE program organized its input and 
integrated assessment work through a Technical Analysis Group (TAG) and a Working 
Group on Target Setting and Policy (WG TSP). The Technical Analysis Group (TAG) 
consisted of members of the CAFE secretariat and consultants carrying out technical 
analysis under specific contracts. The group consists of about 10–20 people and met once a 
year.  The technical analysis in CAFE was mainly carried out under these different contracts 
and therefore the role of the consultants was very important. 
 The TAG was mainly set up to enable the consultants to co-ordinate between 
themselves. Contracts included (1) Development of a Baseline Scenario and an Integrated 
Assessment Model (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria; 
Meteorological Institute, Norway; National Technical University Athens, Greece) (2) Further 
Development and Application of the TREMOVE Transport Model (Catholic University, 
Leuven, Belgium) (3) Cost-Benefit Analysis of the CAFE Programme (AEA Technology) 
and (4) Review of Health Effects (World Health Organisation, Geneva). The consultants 
presented the progress of their work in the Steering Group meetings. All contractors had 
been involved in analysis for the European Commission already in earlier policy 
development processes. The RAINS model had already been used for the preparation of the  
                                                 
6 This section is based on an article by Tuinstra, which is submitted to Environmental Science and Policy. 
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Box 1. Objectives of the CAFE Program 
 
 “Clear Air For Europe will have the general aim of developing a long-term, strategic and 
integrated policy to protect against the effects of air pollution on human health and the 
environment. As required by the treaty, the policy will aim at a high level of environmental 
protection based on the precautionary principle, taking account of the best available scientific 
and technical data and the costs of benefits of action or lack of action.” (European 
Commission, 2001a) 
  
The specific objectives of CAFE are (CAFE- website, 2005):  
1. to develop, collect and validate scientific information relating to the effects of 
outdoor air pollution, emission inventories, air quality assessment, emission and air 
quality projections, cost-effectiveness studies and integrated assessment modeling, 
leading to the development and updating of air quality and deposition objectives and 
indicators and identification of the measures required to reduce emissions;  
2. to support the implementation and review the effectiveness of existing legislation, in 
particular the air quality daughter directives, the decision on exchange of 
information, and national emission ceilings as set out in recent legislation, to 
contribute to the review of international protocols, and to develop new proposals as 
and when necessary;  
3. to ensure that the sector measures that will be needed to achieve air quality and 
deposition objectives cost-effectively are taken at the relevant level through the 
development of effective structural links with sectoral policies;  
4. to determine an overall, integrated strategy at regular intervals which defines 
appropriate air quality objectives for the future and cost-effective measures for 
meeting those objectives;  
NEC directive, the Acidification Strategy and the Ozone Strategy by DG Environment, and 
the PRIMES energy model of the National Technical University Athens and the 
TREMOVE model had been used in earlier analyses for DG Transport and Energy. 
 The purpose of the Working Group on Target Setting and Policy (WG TSP) was to 
assist the Commission in the development of air quality related targets for the protection of 
human health and the environment. It also gave advice on issues related to policies and 
measures. It advised on the Integrated Assessment Modelling work and the choice of 
scenarios. The WG TSP met about four times a year and according to the membership list 
had 18 members: 13 country representatives of Environmental Ministries or Environmental 
Protection Agencies, a representative of the UN-ECE and four environmental and business 
Non Governmental Organisations. 
 Since the integrated assessment process described here took place in the ‘expert 
phase’ of EU legislation development, the Commission services, personified by the CAFE 
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secretariat took the lead. The organisation of the process can be seen as being top-down. 
The civil servants of the Commission who developed the proposal played a very important 
role. The role of the scientists was one of being a consultant. The role of the countries 
(representatives in the steering group) was to give comments. In the steering group meetings 
there was no need to arrive at a consensus.  
 One of the key tasks in the CAFE programme was the development of a baseline 
scenario and an integrated assessment model. CAFE has compiled a set of baseline 
projections outlining the consequences of present legislation for the future development of 
emissions, of air quality and of health and environmental impacts up to the year 2020 
(Amann et al. 2005). In further steps, the CAFE integrated assessment has explored the 
costs and environmental benefits associated with gradually tightened environmental quality 
objectives, starting from the baseline (current legislation) case up to the maximum that can 
be achieved through full application of all presently available technical emission control 
measures (the maximum technically feasible reduction case) (Amann et al., 2005). 
 The CAFE assessment is based on recent scientific knowledge, taking into account: 
 
− Advice received from the World Health Organization on the health impacts of air 
pollution 
− Information on vegetation impacts of air pollution compiled by the UN-ECE CLRTAP 
Working Group on Effects 
− Syntheses of the understanding and modelling of the dispersion of air pollutants in the 
atmosphere at the regional scale developed by the Co-operative Programme for 
Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of Air pollutants in Europe 
(EMEP)   
− Synthesis of the results of the so called City-Delta project, an open model inter-
comparison exercise to explore the changes in urban air quality predicted by different 
atmospheric chemistry-transport dispersion models (CTMs) in response to changes in 
urban emissions. The range of response resulting from this model inter-comparison is to 
be used in the cost-effectiveness analysis of CAFE with the aim to balance Europe-wide 
emission controls against local measures. The model inter-comparison focuses on 
ambient levels of particulate matter and ozone in urban areas. It addresses health-
relevant matrices of exposure (e.g., long-term concentrations) to fine and coarse particles 
and ozone. 
− Projections of future economic activities and their implications on the evolution of 
energy systems and agricultural activities. 
 
For integrating this variety of information to allow policy-relevant conclusions, CAFE has 
employed the RAINS model (Amann at al., 2005). 
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Boundary work at the science–policy interface of the CAFE program 
In the field of air quality policy making in Europe a long tradition exists in using scientific 
information to support negotiations and decisions (e.g., Hordijk 1991; Levy 1993; Castells 
1999; Grünfeld 1999; Tuinstra et al. 1999; Bäckstrand 2001; Wettestad 2002; Grennfelt and 
Hov 2005). Examples of this science-policy interaction are the activities of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) in preparing international 
conventions and protocols in which countries agree on reducing emissions of atmospheric 
pollutants (Sliggers and Kakebeeke 2004). Another example is the preparation of EU 
legislation, e.g. directives on national emissions ceilings and air quality standards (Wettestad 
2002). Both examples show an intensive communication process between scientists and 
policy makers, where knowledge from different scientific disciplines e.g. economy, soil-
science, ecology, meteorology and other knowledge sources is integrated in such a way that it 
provides useful information for decision making. These special communication processes 
can be referred to as assessment processes (e.g. Farrell et al. 2001). Assessment processes are 
embedded in a variety of institutional settings, within which scientists, decision makers and 
other stakeholders communicate to define relevant questions for analysis, mobilise certain 
kinds of experts and expertise, and interpret findings in particular ways (Farrell et al. 2001). 
Models, such as IIASA’s RAINS model, an integrated assessment model at the transnational 
level, play a central role, in providing scientific advice in the European air quality policy 
making process, particularly in setting air quality standards. 
 How scientists and policy makers interact at the interface between science and policy 
has been studied empirically in terms of the ‘boundary work’, through which the boundary 
between science and policy is maintained (e.g., Gieryn 1999; Jasanoff 1990). The main 
conclusion of these studies is that it is impossible to find stable criteria that absolutely 
distinguish science from non-science, e.g., politics. Many social scientists who have studied 
the relationship between the practices of science and decision making have indeed concluded 
that these two categories of activities cannot be neatly separated (e.g., Jasanoff and Wynne 
1998). 
 As shown by Tuinstra (2006), who studied the interface between science and policy 
in the preparation of the 2005 Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution (the Clean Air for Europe 
– CAFE – program), although the European Commission made a clear institutional 
separation between risk assessment (science) and risk management (policy), in practice the 
boundaries between the two are continuously moving. For instance, representatives of 
member states play a role of “experts” in the expert phase and play a role as policy maker 
once the proposal for legislation has been made. The decision who constitutes an “expert” 
and who is a “stakeholder”, or more generally who is allowed to contribute to the 
production of knowledge, is problematic and challenged. Industry actors, for instance, were 
dissatisfied with their labeling as “stakeholders” instead of “experts” in the CAFE process. 
Thus the desired separation between risk assessment and risk management was not fully 
realized. 
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 Tuinstra (submitted) concludes furthermore that the last step in the expert phase, the 
discussion between the different services of the European Commission, is not transparant at 
all. It is difficult to trace how the scientific information that was obtained through the CAFE 
process ultimately influenced the decision making within the Commission. 
4. Adaptation and Anticipation in EU and Dutch PM Policy 
Decisions 
4.a. Adaptation 
4.a.i. Changes in EU Policy Caused by Planned Adaptation: The 2005 Proposal 
to Regulate PM2.5 
At this very moment, negotations between the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers are taking place on the Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution, which will introduce a 
new PM2.5 target (see box 2 for some information on the EU decision-making process). The 
first daughter directive of 1999, which introduced regulation for PM10, contained a review 
clause: at a scheduled time (according to the directive, in 2003) the evidence for the health 
effects of PM2.5 should be reconsidered. This review was effectively incorporated in the 
CAFE program as part of the EU process for reaching an overall Thematic Strategy on Air 
Pollution, which was scheduled to be finalized in 2004, but was delayed by another year. 
Even though there was a two-year delay, the 2005 proposal to indeed regulate PM2.5 can be 
classified as an instance of ‘planned adaptation’. 
Already in 1998 the Commission had published a discussion paper that looked ahead 
towards an overall clean air strategy that would include different elements of EU air 
pollution policy and as such enhance the development of cost-effective solutions. This 
strategy should be renewed in a five-year policy cycle. This 1998 paper was the starting point 
for the Clean Air for Europe (CAFE) programme. As said, the first integrated clean air 
strategy was planned to be adopted in 2004. This process was delayed and the Commission 
presented the Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution in September 2005. The Commission 
claims that the proposed measures would greatly reduce air pollution while providing 
benefits to health that would be many times larger than the abatement costs. 
 In the CAFE programme, six alternative PM2.5 policies were considered (the 
Commission ultimately chose a combination of 2 and 4): 
1. Introduce a legally binding requirement to reduce annual average concentrations of PM2.5 
throughout the territories of the Member States by a given percentage in 2020 relative to 
the position in 2010 as determined by three years of monitoring of PM2.5 concentrations 
in urban background locations;  
2. Introduce a target to reduce annual average concentrations of PM2.5 throughout the 
territories of the Member States by a given percentage in 2020 relative to the position in 
2010 as determined by three years of monitoring of PM2.5 concentrations in urban 
background locations;  
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3. Replace the indicative limit values for PM10 for the year 2010 by a legally binding limit 
value for annual average concentrations of PM2.5 to be attained by 2010. Such a limit 
value would be designed to offer a high degree of protection to the population and 
would apply everywhere in the territory of the Member States;  
4. Replace the indicative limit values for PM10 for the year 2010 by a legally binding “cap” 
for annual average concentrations of PM2.5 to be attained by 2010. Such a “cap” or ceiling 
would be designed to limit unduly high risks to the population and would apply 
everywhere in the territory of the Member States;  
5. Replace the indicative limit values for PM10 for the year 2010 by a non-binding target for 
the annual average concentrations of PM2.5 to be attained as far as possible by 2010. Such 
a target value would be numerically identical to the limit value in option (2) above;  
6. Do nothing, i.e. do not introduce any requirement to reduce human exposure to PM2.5. 
 
Box 2 The development of a directive or regulation in the EU under the co-decision 
procedure.  
 
In the co-decision procedure under which environmental legislation in the EU resides, the European 
Commission has the right of initiative for new legislation proposals. In the expert phase the 
European Commission (in this case DG Environment) collects technical and other information 
needed to develop the proposal. A draft policy proposal is subsequently discussed with other 
Directorates (services) of the European Commission (the so-called inter-services consultation) before 
being published as an official proposal of the European Commission. In the next phase, the 
negotiation phase, the European Parliament (representing the European citizens) discusses the 
proposal and sends its opinion to the Commission. The Commission then sends the amended 
proposal to the Council of the European Union. The Council of the European Union represents the 
governments of the EU member states in different configurations. For example in the case of an 
environmental proposal, the Environment Council, existing of all Environmental Ministers of the 
EU Member States will discuss the proposal but the Transport and Energy Council will do so as well. 
If the Council agrees to the amended proposal the legislation can be adopted and the next phase, the 
implementation phase follows. Otherwise, the proposal will go back to Parliament and Commission 
for new amendments.  
 
It should be noted that the development of the Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution follows a slightly 
different procedure. The strategy will not be negotiated in Council and Parliament. The Council will 
formulate Council conclusions and the Parliament adopt a resolution. Resulting legislative acts  like a 
new air qualitative directive will be decided upon following the normal co-decision procedure. 
Source: European Communities, 2003. 
 
 For PM10, the Commission’s proposal is not to tighthen the PM10 standards 
(reversing an earlier decision in 1999), but instead to introduce a new PM2.5 standard. An 
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annual concentration cap is proposed for the finer fraction of particulate matter (PM2.5) of 25 
µg/m3 averaged per year that has to be attained by 2010 throughout the entire territory of 
each member state. After 2010, a reduction of the average urban background concentration 
of PM2.5 is required over the period between 2010 and 2020. The proposal also includes a 
possibility for derogation of the limit values for particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5) by a 
maximum of 5 years beyond the attainment date if certain criteria are met. Any request for 
time extension should be accompanied by a plan to ensure compliance within the extended 
time period.  
 The European Parliament environment committee voted overwhelmingly in favor of 
tightened limit values on air pollution in a vote on 21 June 2006. Specifically, MEPs called 
for more ambitious PM2.5 targets. On 26 September 2006, the European Parliament voted to 
reduce the annual PM10 norm to 33 µg/m3 by the year 2010 and to introduce an indicative 
PM2.5 norm of 20 µg/m3 in 2010. The PM10 norm is stricter than the 40 µg/m3 originally 
proposed by the Commission (equal to the current limit value). At the insistence of German 
conservative MEPs in the environment committee, some flexibility was granted as to how 
member states should meet the new pollution limits. This flexibility was taken over by the 
Parliament on 26 September 2006. The Environment Council of Ministers is expected to 
vote on the proposal in this first reading before the end of 2006. 
 The change of the original proposal by the Commission to introduce a binding PM2.5 
target and instead propose a non-binding target was explained by the European Parliament 
to be due to the uncertainties that still surround the whole PM debate. Therefore, the 
Parliament proposed a scheduled review, so that the target could become binding if the 
scientific evidence became stronger. 
 
4.a.ii. Changes in EU and Dutch Policy Caused by Other Processes: The 1999 
Decision to Regulate PM10 and the Obstacles Met in the Dutch 
Implementation 
 
The pre-1996 Directives were based on the best scientific evidence available at that time, and 
in particular the work of the World Health Organisation (WHO), but there had been further 
research on the effects of air pollution on both human health and the environment, which it 
was felt should be taken into account. In addition, implementation of the existing Directives 
revealed a number of problems. It was therefore decided that the European Union should 
bring air quality limit directives up to date. This led to the 1996 framework directive. In 
1999, the air quality standards for ‘suspended particles’ were replaced by standards for only 
the smaller fraction of PM10. In the 1980 directive that regulated suspended particles, no 
review was scheduled. Therefore the 1999 decision to regulate PM10 can be classified as an 
‘unplanned adaptation’. 
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 Besides taking measures at the international level, individual countries and some 
lower-level governmental actors craft policies that aim to assist in meeting the targets set. 
Depending on how the Directive is implemented in national law, subnational governmental 
actors can even have an obligation to create their own policies. Such is the case in the 
Netherlands. The concentration levels of substances from the first daughter directive 
(among which PM10) have been an important element in the definition of the zones and 
agglomerations in the Netherlands (Van Breugel and Buijsman, 2001). The result has been a 
subdivision of the Netherlands into three zones and six agglomerations. The agglomerations 
are urban areas with at least 250,000 residents. Moreover, the first daughter directive 
stipulates the numbers of monitoring stations in the zones and agglomerations, which are in 
turn dependent on the numbers of residents and the concentration levels. The Directive also 
contains regulations concerning the monitoring apparatus to be used. 
 The Dutch government opted for a strict – one could even say ‘formalistic’ – 
interpretation of the directive: ‘the limit values, set by the European Directive, are 
interpreted as absolute limits, to be taken into consideration by all authorities at all levels of 
government in the exercise of all their functions which could have an impact on air quality’ 
(Fleurke and Koeman 2005, 382). The Directive stipulates two limit values for PM10. There is 
a limit value for the annual average concentration of particulate matter that is primarily 
intended to offer protection against the long-term effects of particulate matter. This limit 
value is 40 µg/m3. The second limit value concerns the 24-hour concentration of particulate 
matter. This is primarily intended to provide protection against the short-term effects. 
Specifically, the Directive stipulates that the limit value for the 24-hour average (50 µg/m3) 
cannot be exceeded for more than 35 days during each calendar year. 
 Since, like several other European countries, the Netherlands at many locations 
continuously exceeds the limit values of PM10, non-governmental actors have increasingly 
challenged local decisions, even those not directly but only indirectly affecting future air 
quality. As was reported by Koelemeijer et al. (2005), more than 40 spatial plans proposed by 
Dutch authorities have been appealed by stakeholders since 2001 on grounds of possible 
breaching of air quality limit values. In about one-third of the cases, the appeal was sustained 
by the highest court of justice on these matters because of air quality reasons, which resulted 
in the rejection of the plans. This concerned zoning plans for development of homes and 
business parks, permits for industrial activities, and plans for road construction or 
modification. The Dutch jurisprudence has clearly demonstrated the necessity of very 
detailed impact assessments, before permits for spatial developments can be granted. 
Moreover, air quality that does not meet the limit values can mean calling a halt to spatial 
developments, thereby conflicting with the general approach which Dutch authorities and 
companies have used in the past to assess the consequences of their (spatial) plans. 
 Koelemeijer et al. (2005) also found in their investigation of other EU countries that 
only few court cases of this type have occurred elsewhere, while breaches of air quality limit 
values and the limit values enhanced by the margin of tolerance do occur in other EU 
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countries as well. To explain this situation, they have studied the transposition and 
application of the first Daughter Directive on Air Quality in seven member states: Austria, 
Belgium (Flanders), France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. The 
Netherlands was found to have implemented the first EU Daughter Directive on Air Quality 
in a relatively strict fashion compared to other countries. While most countries show 
exceedances of limit values, and all countries base their policy on the same EU air quality 
directives, considerable differences exist between member states with respect to the role limit 
values play in granting permits for new (spatial) developments. This is related to four aspects 
of the Dutch implementation. 
 First, the Netherlands enforced a strict legal coupling between air quality policy and 
spatial planning policy. Not only are all plans that directly affect air quality subject to an 
impact assessment, but also plans that affect exposure of the population to polluted air. If 
the impact assessment does not show how all relevant (future) limit values will be met, or 
how the plan fits into a general policy to meet the limit values, the court may reject it upon 
appeal. Second, limit values are perceived as absolute limit values, whereas in other countries 
(Belgium, France, UK), the need to meet a limit value is weighted with other interests when 
deciding on whether to grant permits. Although Germany also perceives limit values as being 
absolute, the consequences for granting permits for spatial developments are not as far-
reaching as in the Netherlands. Third, limit values apply to the whole of the Netherlands. In 
principle, these limit values apply in all other countries to anywhere in the outdoors. 
However, Germany and Austria, at least, infer from the nature of the limit values that they 
only have to be met at locations where people can be expected to be exposed for a period 
that is significant compared to the averaging period of the limit value. Finally, in the 
Netherlands, air quality is assessed with much detail, because it is based on a combination of 
measuring and modelling with high spatial resolution. Consequently, many places are 
designated as locations where air quality limit values are breached, particularly in built-up 
areas close to busy roads. A limited number of countries also employ models with high 
spatial detail, but many countries only use measurements to assess air quality. 
 Faced with the severe economic and social consequences of its environmental rules, 
the Netherlands is now slowly but gradually moving towards a more flexible interpretation 
of the EU Directive. A more flexible interpretation of the Directive – called the ‘moderate’ 
approach by Fleurke and Koeman (2005, 382) – is to argue that ‘the limit values should be 
achieved, in the first place, at national level, through national measures rejecting the 
interpretation that all activities which have only a limited effect on air quality must be subject 
to an impact assessment’. Although the limit values are absolute, this does not mean that the 
Air Quality Order should become the overriding concern in all decisions on spatial planning 
or infrastructure projects. The approach should be to deal with the large polluters first. The 
Dutch government took a first step towards this more flexible interpretation by issuing a 
new Air Quality Order in 2005. Some flexibility has been built in. For example, the 
European legislation offers possibilities to subtract particulate matter originating from 
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‘natural phenomena’ from the measured particulate matter concentrations under certain 
conditions. Thus, the Netherlands is now subtracting the seasalt contribution to PM10. 
Furthermore, a possibility to average the air quality over larger areas (compensation scheme) 
was introduced (although it is not yet clear whether the European Commission will find this 
acceptable). Finally, the stand-still principle that was enshrined in the old Order was 
removed, which allows increases in PM concentrations in areas that are still under the limit. 
However, as Fleurke and Koeman (2005, 383) conclude, ‘it is doubtful if this will do the trick 
as all administrative decision by all authorities will still have to be assessed as to their effects 
on air quality’. 
 We can conclude that in the implementation phase national policies adapt to 
changing scientific insights and societal or political opposition. The changes in the Dutch 
implementation of the 1999 daughter directive must be characterized as ad hoc. The failure 
of anticipation of the societal and economic obstacles faced in the implementation of the EU 
daughter directive is further dealt with in section 4.b.iii. 
4.a.iii. Notable Delays in Change and Their Causes 
As compared with the United States, it looks as if the introduction of PM2.5 norms has been 
significantly delayed. In 2006, the Europeans are still debating what kind of norms to 
implement for 2010 that are less strict than the norms that have already been in place in the 
US since 1997. Again, as was the case for the introduction of the PM10 norms in the EU 
(the decision was taken in 1996, nine years after the US introduced its PM10 norms), there 
seems to be a delay of nine years. From the US perspective, this may indeed be called a 
‘delay’. An alternative reading, however, is that US regulators have taken a more 
precautionary approach, with the facts about PM2.5 and its effects on health still being 
uncertain (see section 4.b.ii). Faced with the same uncertainties, US regulators deemed it 
necessary in 1997 to regulate PM2.5, while EU decision makers found the evidence base too 
uncertain to warrant immediate measures. But worries were raised in the EU too. Therefore 
the monitoring of PM2.5 has already become mandatory at a small scale since the 1999 
directive and a review of the evidence was foreseen within several years after the 
introduction of the directive. And at the present moment EU regulators do find the evidence 
strong enough to introduce a norm – though the European Parliament still doubts whether 
the evidence is strong enough to warrant the introduction of a binding target. It remains to 
be analyzed what exactly were the societal pressures in the US and EU pro and against the 
PM2.5 norms and how these pressures influenced the final decision making. 
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4.b. Anticipation 
4.b.i. Level of Transparency of Modeling Processes and the Creation of 
Credibility 
In the 1980s and 1990s, scientific and policy communities in longe-range transboundary air 
pollution have approached each other and developed a mutual dependency: the increased 
availability of information through the use of models and the trust given to the experts 
greatly facilitated institutional innovation. Based on a debriefing exercise concerning the use 
of the RAINS model in international negotiations, Mermet and Hordijk (1989) presented a 
framework that correlates the role of assessment models to different kinds of policy contexts 
in which they are used and to the level of use (table 1). The point where parties accept the 
model as a shared frame of reference for policy making is not easily achieved and requires 
that the research community negotiates credibility for the science and actively builds trust 
relationships with the actors involved. In the end, the RAINS model played a major role in 
the international acid deposition negotiations in the framework of the United Nations 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and became an annex to the 
United Nations SO2 protocol. (Hordijk 1991). 
 
 
 
 Role of model
 User level
  Individual  Collective 
 (joint use by all parties)
Model as motor 
of the process
A party promotes the 
model as an active basis 
for its position
All parties agree to use the 
model as reference 
framework for the process
Model as a 
source of 
information
A party uses the model 
to complement the 
argumentation of its 
position
The model is considered by 
all parties as one source of 
information used in the 
process
Model 
indifferent 
because marginal 
or useless
A party is reluctant to 
move from the political 
to a more technical 
ground
The negotiation is so 
adversarial that "rational" 
analysis of the problem 
plays little role
Model 
undesirable
A party disagrees on the 
science or fights the 
model as a tactic in the 
negotiations politics
Prospects for the use of the 
models are terrible
Table 1 Types and levels of use of assessment models in the negotiation process (Mermet and 
Hordijk 1989). 
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The science–policy interface in the CAFE program was explicitly organized as a much 
more open and transparant process as compared with the preparation of earlier directives. 
This was part of an overall strategy in the EU to increase transparency. The CAFE 
secretariat took great effort to make sure that the work would have credibility, legitimacy and 
relevance (Tuinstra submitted). 
Steps to enhance credibility included e.g. the a special review procedure of the 
RAINS model. Furthermore bilateral consulations  took place with individual countries on 
inputs for the models used (see Tuinstra, submitted). This enhanced both the credibility and 
legitimacy of the use of the model for several countries.  
4.b.ii. Assessment of Knowledge and Uncertainties in EU PM Policy Making 
 
In this section, we will analyze what uncertainties are present in the PM and health problem 
and how they are dealt with in European integrated assessment efforts. Even though the 
evidence from epidemiological studies accumulates and consistently shows statistically 
significant associations between health effects and PM10 or PM2.5 concentrations (Pope and 
Dockery 2006), large uncertainties and controversy remain about the sources, exposure and 
causes of health effects (RIVM 2002; MNP 2005; Moolgavkar 2005; Maas 2006). On the 
basis of an expert meeting with Dutch experts on particulate matter and health organised by 
MNP and Utrecht University in May 2005 (Kloprogge and van der Sluijs 2006), combined 
with the Impact Assessment of the EU’s Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution 
(COM(2005)446 and 447), we have identified the following key sources of uncertainty in the 
integrated assessment of the PM and health problem: 
 
a) attribution of effects to individual species of particle (causal fraction) or other pollutants 
or stressors; 
b) quantification of the mortality impact of exposure to fine particles; 
c) distribution of risk over subgroups of the population (to what extent is the relative risk 
age-dependent?); 
d) valuation of mortality impacts from particles and other pollutants; 
e) assessment of effects of chronic exposure to particles on the prevalence of bronchitis; 
f) inter-annual variability in meteorology; 
g) uncertainty in cost estimates of measures; 
h) emission data; 
i) poor understanding of secondary organic particles; and 
j) measurement uncertainty. 
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 Below, we use the structure of the MNP Guidance for Uncertainty Assessment and 
Communication (MNP/UU 2003), shown in figure 1, for systematically reflecting on issues of 
uncertainty management and communication in the case of health risks from PM.  
 Problem framing. Four problem views can be distinguished in the policy debate on 
particulate matter: “PM2.5 is the problem”, “PM10 is the problem”, “Specific traffic related 
species are problem (e.g., diesel soot)”, and “It is mainly a socio-economic problem (PM not 
main cause)” (Maas 2006). The conclusions of scientific assessments of the PM problem are 
critically sensitive to the problem frame chosen, while the present state of knowledge is 
inconclusive regarding which framing is most adequate. For instance, strong associations can 
also be found between cardiopulmonary diseases and  
 
Foci Key issues 
Problem framing 
Other problem views; interwovenness with other problems; 
system boundaries; role of results in policy process; 
relation to previous assessments 
Involvement of 
stakeholders 
Identifying stakeholders; their views and roles; 
controversies; mode of involvement 
Selection of 
indicators 
Adequate backing for selection; alternative indicators; 
support for selection in science, society, and politics 
Appraisal of 
knowledge base 
Quality required; bottlenecks in available knowledge and 
methods; impact of bottlenecks on quality of results 
Mapping and 
assessing 
relevant 
uncertainties 
Identification and prioritisation of key uncertainties; choice 
of methods to assess these; assessing robustness of 
conclusions 
Reporting 
uncertainty 
information 
Context of reporting; robustness and clarity of main 
messages; policy implications of uncertainty; balanced 
and consistent representation in progressive disclosure of 
uncertainty information; traceability and adequate backing 
Figure 1 
Foci and key issues in uncertainty assessment and communication (MNP/UU 2003). 
 
for traffic noise (Kempen et al. 2002), the quality of housing and the diet of low income 
families (Eschenroeder and Norris 2003). Even though recent attempts to correct for such 
confounding effects have strengthened the evidence for low-dose PM effects on health, it 
can still not be ruled out that the observed health effects are largely caused by an 
accumulation of other causes in low income neighbourhoods close to highways. The degree 
to which such interwovenness with other problems is taken into account and the choices 
made for the system boundary may influence the conclusions. This requires systematic 
reflection by science advisers. The way uncertainties about the health risks of PM should be 
dealt with in policy advice depends on the role of such advice in the policy process. In some 
countries, such as the United States, PM2.5 has already been regulated since 1997, while in 
the European Union such regulation is still being discussed. In the first case, the focus of 
assessments is more on the effectiveness of existing or proposed regulation than on the need 
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for setting new air quality standards. And thus the types of uncertainties that are most 
important to deal with differ among these cases. 
 Involvement of stakeholders. Participation of stakeholders in knowledge 
production can help to increase the quality of the risk assessment. Participation stimulates 
the inclusion of more viewpoints, which in turn helps to rule out that important dimensions 
of the problem are overlooked. Further, participation opens opportunities to make use of 
local knowledge. The lack of inclusion of such local knowledge frequently forms a barrier to 
the acceptance of scientific assessments as a shared basis for decision making. Examples of 
relevant local knowledge on PM include reflections on the (in)adequacy of existing emission 
monitoring systems and substantive knowledge on the values of parameters in local air 
pollution models (Yearley 1999). However, in current practice this reservoir of local 
knowledge is hardly utilised, which is an omission. Participation of stakeholders in 
assessment can also improve the use of assessments. For instance, in the US, proposals for 
new air quality standards, such as the revision of the NAAQS for PM proposed in 2005, 
undergo a public review that aims to build a widely shared scientific basis. As another 
example: in the Clean Air for Europe programme, over one hundred stakeholder meetings 
were organised to disseminate results, to share experiences on the use of different policy 
instruments (including economic instruments), to discuss issues relating to the 
implementation of current air quality legislation, and to review the uncertainties and their 
implications. 
 Selection of indicators. The choice of using particle size to assess and regulate 
health risks of PM is problematic. Generally speaking, particle size is an imperfect proxy for 
toxicity. The chemical composition and reactive surface of the particles may be of much 
more importance, but are difficult to measure and monitor. PM10 and PM2.5 may not be the 
most relevant indicators for the health risks from PM; depending on the problem frame 
chosen, other indicators become more relevant (e.g., specific chemical fractions). If specific 
chemical PM fractions are suspected to be primarily responsible for the health impacts (e.g., 
particles emitted from cars), then reducing SO2 emissions from electric utilities is not an 
effective way to reduce health risks, despite the fact that PM2.5 concentrations (secondary 
particles) decrease. Furthermore, the precise formulation of indicators used in the regulation 
of PM varies between countries. For instance, in the United States the 24-hour standard of 
PM10 of 150 μg/m3 may be exceeded once a year, while in the EU a standard of 50 μg/m3 
may not be exceeded more than 35 days per year, which makes comparison between these 
standards difficult, though not impossible. In this paper, it was concluded from a 
comparison of both standards using data from 18 monitoring stations in the Netherlands 
that the EU norm is more strict in most cases. In contrast, it was also observed that the 
current PM2.5 standard in the US (effective since 1997) is more strict than the proposed 
standard in the EU. Thus the choice and precise definition of indicators makes a huge 
difference in practice. 
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 Appraisal of knowledge base. There is a broad consensus among scientists and 
policy makers that PM constitutes health risks that need regulation. However, the evidence 
from toxicological and biological studies is still weak (Moolgavkar 2005). While there are 
several plausible hypotheses, it is recognised that we are ignorant of the true underlying 
mechanism that explains the association between PM and health effects. Only a small 
number of long-term epidemiological cohort studies have been performed, mainly in the 
United States. It is questionable whether the results are representative for other countries. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine the exposure to PM (exposure depends on the 
behavior of individuals, for which assumptions have to be made), to establish a reliable 
exposure–effect relationship, and to account for multicausality and synergies. Finally, there 
are bottlenecks in determining PM emissions and concentrations: measurements are often 
unreliable or not representative for larger areas; and models often give estimates that are not 
in agreement with measurements. 
 Mapping and assessing relevant uncertainties. In table 2, the key sources of 
uncertainty a) through j) are mapped on the uncertainty typology of the Guidance. In 
thetable we can see that model structure uncertainty and data uncertainty are particularly 
pertinent in this case, that the quality of the evidence for the causal models is considered 
problematic, that model assumptions may be subject to subjective choices (cf. Kloprogge et 
al. 2006) and that the data uncertainty for emissions, meteorology and concentrations are 
largely characterized by variability and can thus not be fully reduced. This analysis shows that 
the classical statistical uncertainty methods are not sufficient to deal with the key 
uncertainties in the PM and health case, and that other methods are implied. Scenario 
uncertainties can be addressed by scenario analysis techniques. For an assessment of the 
qualification of the knowledge base for a particular model structure, for example, pedigree 
analysis (van der Sluijs et al. 2005; Refsgaard et al. 2006) or a model quality checklist (Risbey 
et al. 2005) can be used. The value-ladenness of a model can be assessed, for instance, by 
way of critical analysis of assumptions (Kloprogge et al. 2005) or perspective-based scenarios 
(van Asselt 2000). In CAFE, some of the uncertainties have been analysed by way of 
sensitivity analysis, focussing particularly on uncertainties in energy demand and agricultural 
production, emission data and emissions abatement factors, the various ambition levels, or 
target-setting methods.  
 Reporting uncertainty information. The uncertainty aspects of the integrated 
assessment of the PM and health problem have been described in the Impact Assessment. 
Uncertainty ranges were published in the Impact Assessment for the benefits of the 
Commission’s Thematic Strategy, with as one of the main aims a reduction by 20% of the 
average urban background concentration of PM2.5 in the period between 2010 and 2020. The 
estimates of total benefits of the Thematic Strategy vary between €37 billion and €119 billion 
per annum in 2020. These are between seven and 24 times higher than the estimated costs of 
between €5 and €8 billion per annum.  
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Box 3 Uncertainty Typology 
In order to facilitate communication about the different types of uncertainty that arise in scientific 
assessments, an uncertainty typology is part of the MNP Guidance for Uncertainty Assessment and 
Communication. The typology is based on a conceptual framework that resulted from a process 
involving an international group of uncertainty experts most of whom participated in developing or 
reviewing the Guidance. Uncertainty can be classified along the following dimensions: its ‘location’ 
(where it occurs), its ‘level’ (whether it can best be characterised as statistical uncertainty, scenario 
uncertainty or recognised ignorance) and its ‘nature’ (whether uncertainty primarily stems from 
knowledge imperfection or is a direct consequence of inherent variability). In addition, the typology 
distinguishes the dimensions ‘qualification of knowledge base’ (what are weak and strong parts in the 
assessment) and ‘value-ladenness of choices’ (what biases may shape the assessment). The typology is 
presented as a matrix. This uncertainty matrix is used as an instrument for generating an overview of 
where one expects the most important (policy-relevant) uncertainties to be located (the first 
dimension), and how these can be further characterised in terms of the other uncertainty dimensions 
mentioned. The matrix can be used as a scanning tool to identify areas where a more elaborate 
uncertainty assessment is required. The different cells in the matrix are linked to available uncertainty 
assessment tools suitable for tackling that particular uncertainty type. These tools are described in a 
Tool Catalogue that aims to assist the analyst in choosing appropriate methods.  
 
 
Level of uncertainty 
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Table 1 
Uncertainty Matrix. The labels refer to the sources of uncertainty mentioned in the text. The 
function of this matrix is to identify the most salient uncertainty types that should be addressed in 
uncertainty assessment and communication. The typification has been done by the authors. 
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If we take all the uncertainties into consideration, and add the possibility that regulating size 
fractions of PM may not be an effective way to increase health, we must admit that not all 
knowledge that is available makes explicitly part of the decision making process. Although 
we would not want to defend the claim that knowledge is being actively suppressed in the 
European context, we do think that other views on the PM–health problem deserve more 
policy attention. 
 It is possible to identify in the literature four ‘stylized’ ways to define the PM 
problem (see figure 2): 
1) ‘PM2.5’ – focus on transboundary air pollution and secondary inorganic particles 
2) ‘PM10’ – a large part will be PM2.5 but also the abatement of primary emissions of coarse 
particles becomes part of the strategy 
3) ‘PMx’ – focus on the traffic related carbonaceous particles & ultrafines, since these are 
considered to be particularly toxic 
4) ‘No PM’ – focus on living conditions in low income neighbourhoods 
Focus on EC/OC & ultrafines
EU-regulation vehicles,
refineries
Transport policy
Abate local sources
Including coarse fractions:
eg. building industry; wood
burning; resuspension
Transboundary policy
 Focus on secondary particles
    
Focus on living conditions
Improve socio-economic
conditions
Traffic circulation
Finding the right balance between
precaution & wasting money
PMx PM2.5
No PM PM10
N
o 
re
gr
et
 -
 r
eg
re
t
Trade off between PMs 
Co-benefits - No co-benefits
 
Figure 2 
Finding the right balance between precaution and wasting money 
 
We may therefore seriously question whether a sole focus on regulating a certain size 
fraction of PM (be it PM10 or PM2.5) is the best policy option to available to improve human 
health. 
 
4.b.iii. Misanticipation in Dutch PM Policy Making 
 
The case of building projects in the Netherlands provides a clear example of misanticipation. 
The Netherlands chose a more strict interpretation of the EU air quality limit values than did 
many other EU countries.  The Netherlands also required the use of detailed modeling to 
help predict the impact of construction projects on air quality. Policymakers did not initially 
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consider the high economic costs of this strict interpretation of the EU air quality limit 
values, and they did not foresee the strict way the judiciary would turn out to actually enforce 
the air quality order of 2001. They are now reconsidering their method of interpretation of 
the standards. The misanticipation in this case was the failure to anticipate the high 
economic and social costs of the policy. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In this paper, the EU policy making process for setting PM standards and the Dutch policy 
making process for implementing them have been reviewed. It seems that with respect to 
PM2.5 standard setting, the EU is clearly on a planned adaptation course. Since 1999, the 
scientific knowledge is scheduled to be reviewed about every five years. The question 
remains why the US has chosen a more precautionary approach than the EU. Can this be 
explained by ‘pure politics’ and is there a disconnect between science and policy in the EU, 
given that the European Commission has significant freedom to do with the science what it 
deems right and their proposals subsequently enter a political negotiation phase? Or, 
alternatively, is there a serious concern about using the wrong indicator (PM2.5) for policies 
that aim to improve health conditions. The US has abandoned its annual PM10 norm. Are we 
certain enough about what causes the statistical relationship between PM and health effects 
to justify such a policy change? 
We cannot be sure that the health effects of PM2.5-10 are small. 
 The policy adaptation in the CAFE program to make the science–policy interface 
more transparent, although being part of a wider EU strategy to increase participation in 
decision making, seems to be driven largely by instrumental reasons. Reasons of increased 
quality control and making use of a wider range of relevant wisdom and democratization of 
science in general (see, e.g., NRC 1996) seemed to have played only a minor role. This may 
explain the frustration of industry that was not granted an expert role in the process. We 
cannot easily say that the industry lobby has caused the ‘delay’ in implementing the PM2.5 
norm. 
 In the Dutch case of implementing the EU standards for PM10 (and other air 
pollutants), we found that the Dutch implemented the EU directive in a very strict manner. 
We do not want to claim here that this was an erroneous decision. If you really want to have 
clean air, you will have to work for it. The only thing that we wanted to point out is that the 
Dutch government had misanticipated the social and economic consequences and that it was 
subsequently forced to adapt its policies on an ad hoc basis. The source of the problems is of 
course nonattainment of the standards. The Netherlands is not the only EU country facing 
this problem. Many member countries have problems with attaining the PM standards. The 
newly proposed EU directive that introduces the PM2.5 norm also introduces more flexibility 
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and possibilities for delayed attainment dates for the existing PM10 norms. In that sense, the 
new directive also constitutes an unplanned adaptation at the EU level. 
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6. Introduction 
The U.S. study focuses on four cases within federal U.S. air quality policy. The four cases are 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for particulate matter (PM) and sulfur dioxide 
(SO2), the Acid Rain Program, and the Clean Air Interstate Rule. The latter is partly a case by 
itself and is also part of the Acid Rain Program case because it was implemented recently, in 
2005, and a complete retrospective analysis is not possible.  
In the air quality policy decisions these cases encompass, policymakers have dealt 
with scientific uncertainty – they have navigated the hazy boundary between science and 
policy.  This study’s broad goal is to understand whether the practices at the science-policy 
interface made the decisions in one case more robust than those in the others. In the cases: 
Which processes have helped facilitate the assimilation and surfacing of relevant 
information? Which have reduced the nastiness of fights over policy options and over the 
science used to justify them? Which have broadened participation in the development of 
policy and broadened acceptance of decisions? Examples of successful negotiations of the 
science-policy boundary could inform the design of future policy institutions, especially as 
the sciences have been playing an increasingly dominant role in the justification of 
environmental policy. 
One conclusion of the study is that the institutions and circumstances in the PM air 
quality standard (NAAQS) case have been more successful at handling uncertainty and at 
updating decisions to new information than the other cases. This has allowed the U.S. to 
lead other countries in its adoption of protective PM2.5 air quality standards, which have 
generated large health benefits.  The unanswered question is how did that program achieve 
this, especially when compared to the other, less successful, U.S. cases that have many 
similar characteristics?  
To answer this question, this study examines the relationships between these four 
cases. Doing so enables a richer analysis than would be possible for each case alone. Because 
of its emphasis on connections, this study does not describe every policy decision related to 
PM or SO2 made in the U.S. between 1970 and the present. It mentions important decisions 
to control mobile sources of pollution, but the analysis focuses on federal stationary source 
policy. 
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The cases suggest that the PM program was more successful at handling uncertainty 
and at adapting to new information than the other programs because of a confluence of 
positive factors. Negative factors like industry using the arguments about the validity of 
science and the court system to delay policy actions occurred in all cases. But, the PM case 
benefited from each one of the positive influences identified; this was not true for any other 
case. The chart in Table I summarizes these findings. 
 
Table I. Summary of characteristics, influences, and outcomes for the four U.S. cases. 
Basic Characteristics
PM 
NAAQS
SO2 
NAAQS
Acid 
Rain
CAIR
Congressional Mandate
Mandated Reviews
Ambient Standard
Direct Regulation
Positive Influences
New Knowledge Assessment
Legitimate N/A
Credible N/A
Salient N/A
Court Motivation
Extrnl. Incentv. to Surface Info
Interest Group Politics
Negative Influences
Courts Cause Delay
Science/Models Challenged
Interest Group Politics/Politics
Outcomes (Positive)
Early Warning --> Data Collctn
Decisions Anticipate Science
Reviews Completed
Planned Adaptation Occurs
Adaptation Occurs
Partial fulfillment
Fulfillment
No Fulfillment  
 
 
Strong external incentives also motivated policymakers and others to surface 
information supporting changes in the PM air quality standards. The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Congress, some portions of industry, and academics all wanted 
the Acid Rain Program and its novel cap-and-trade program to succeed. The PM2.5 standards 
and the science behind them – which the PM reviews generated and assessed – provided key 
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evidence of the achievements of the Acid Rain Program. Public interest groups supported 
changes in the PM NAAQS independently of external motivations. 
The analysis is divided into two sections. Section 2 includes a timeline of major decisions 
relevant to these four cases and an overview of the important institutions of the science-
policy interface for federal air quality policy in the United States. Section 3 is the bulk of the 
analysis. It analyzes the cases with respect to adaptation, anticipation, and incentives to 
surface knowledge. The final section concludes.  
In section three, particular focus is placed on understanding whether planned adaptation 
has enabled robust policy decisions: have mandatory, scheduled policy reviews ever lead to a 
series of policy decisions, each made with explicit acknowledgement of uncertainty, that are 
consistent with a retrospective analysis of the best available science? Adaptation to new 
knowledge is needed as an option for dealing with uncertainty because of the inherent 
limitations of the natural and social sciences to forecast, or anticipate, the outcomes of policy 
decisions. But, there are many forces working against adaptation. The study also considers 
whether broad participation in the formulation of science and modeling processes 
(transparency) lead to fewer disputes over models and to the incorporation of the best 
available knowledge. 
7. Section 2: Policy background 
7.a. Timeline of relevant, major decisions 
This section presents a high-level overview of the decisions made between 1970 and 2006 
that are relevant to the four cases. Figure 1 also shows this timeline. 
In 1970 Congress passed the Clean Air Act (CAA) that required the EPA to set air 
quality standards (NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants7 and to review these standards on a 
five-year interval. In 1971 the EPA set the original standards.8 The EPA began planning 
reviews of the six NAAQS in 1976 and scheduled the first review of the SO2 and PM 
standards to begin, as a joint endeavor, in 1979.9   In the 1977 CAA Amendments Congress 
reinforced the importance of the reviews by directing the EPA to finish all the reviews by 
1980 and subsequent reviews at five-year intervals after 1980. 
The EPA released the final drafts of the criteria document for SO2 and PM and two 
separate staff papers for SO2 and PM in 1982. The EPA did not give notice of proposed 
rulemaking for the PM decision until March of 1984. Two complications caused this delay: 
the EPA Administrator resigned in 1983 and a Reagan executive order required the EPA to 
submit a Regulatory Impact Analysis for the PM decision to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB).  The delay between the completion of the NAAQS review documents and 
the proposed rulemaking provided American Steel and Iron the grounds to bring a lawsuit 
                                                 
7 The six criteria pollutants are particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, ozone, and lead. 
8 The FR citation for the original PM NAAQS decision is (36 Fed. Reg. 8186) 
9 44 Fed. Reg. 56731 
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against the EPA in 1984. American Steel and Iron argued that the proposed rulemaking for 
PM did not “accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge” as required by the CAA.10
 
 
Timelines of major SO2 and PM federal policy decisions in the U.S. 
With this lawsuit and the expectation of similar ones as motivation, the EPA decided 
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Figure 1. 
 
 
to write addenda to the original 1982 Criteria Document for SO2 and PM in 1985. The EPA 
released these documents in 1986. The EPA Administrator signed the final rule that updated 
the standard for PM in July of 1987.11 The change in PM standard dissolved the standard for 
Total Suspended Particulates (TSP) in favor of a standard for PM with a mean aerodynamic 
diameter smaller than or equal to 10 microns (PM10)12.  
Other policy actions relevant to both SO2 and PM
ongress passed the Acid Deposition Act that created the National Acid Precipitation 
Assessment Program (NAPAP).  The motivation for this program was to understand 
relationships between SO2 emissions and acid rain and between acid rain and environm
 
10 CAA §108(a)(2) 
11 52 Fed. Reg. 24634 
12 The indicator of PM10 actually refers the aerodynamic particle diameter for which the efficiency of collection is 50%. 
This means that the particle measurement techniques don’t exclude larger particles, but collect them with decreasing 
efficiency. Smaller particles are collected with increasing efficiency, up to 100%. If ambient samplers are used with a 
cutpoint of PM10, the total amount of particles with diameters less than 10 µm is reliably measured.  
40 
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damage. NAPAP’s focus, unlike the NAAQS process, was not the health impacts of SO2 and
its secondary pollutants, like acid aerosols – a specific type of particulate matter (PM).
 
90 
CAA A
 
d its permit-trading program regulate SO2 but, 
interest 980s, 
am 
out 9 
he first review of the air quality standards for SO2 ended with no change to 
the stan
oth 
 review of the NAAQS for PM in 1987. The second 
review 
ram 
e 
new, more stringent standards for PM2.5.18
                                                
13  
The ADA and NAPAP were the foundation for the Acid Rain Program in the 19
mendments. In a landmark step, Congress created the first large-scale cap-and-trade 
program, which regulated SO2 emissions from stationary sources (Titles IV and V of the 
1990 CAA Amendments).  Precursors of acid rain are SO2 emissions and, to some extent,
nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions.  
The Acid Rain Program an
ingly, they were not created to help states attain the SO2 NAAQS. By the 1
almost all states were in compliance with the original SO2 NAAQS. The Acid Rain Progr
reduced SO2 emissions directly, but the reductions were not needed to meet the SO2 
NAAQS.14 The first phase of the Acid Rain Program took effect in 1995, resulting in 
reductions of about 40% from affected stationary sources (from about 16 million to ab
million tons).15  
In 1996 t
dard. This review was the same one that started in 1979 with the review of the PM 
standard. It was the Acid Rain Program and not the SO2 air quality standards that drove 
reductions in SO2 in the 1990s. Although the Acid Rain Program and the SO2 NAAQS b
focus on SO2, the two policy mechanisms were not directly related in that decisions for one 
did not compel decisions for the other. 
The EPA commenced its second
ended in 1997 with the creation of a standard for PM with diameter less than 2.5 
microns (PM2.5) in addition to a tightening of the PM10 standard. Also in 1997, the EPA 
announced the start of the third review for PM. The second phase of the Acid Rain Prog
took effect in 2000, requiring further reductions of SO2 emissions from stationary sources. 
Between 1999 and 2001, the courts vacated the new standard for PM10 but the U.S. Suprem
Court upheld the standard for PM2.5.16  In 2004, the courts mandated that the third review of 
the PM NAAQS be completed by 2006.17 On September 21 of 2006 the EPA announced its 
 
13 Sulfates are a type of particulate matter. 
14 See, “Sulfur dioxide National and Local Trends in Sulfur Dioxide Levels,” at 
lhttp://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/sulfur.htm  last viewed October 2, 2006. 
h Service Issue Brief for Congress, 
#Implementation%20--%20SO2
15 See, Parker, L. “Implementing Acid Rain Legislation,” Congressional Researc
November 15, 1994, at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Air/air-8.cfm  last 
viewed August 15, 2006 and EPA Clean Air Market’s – Acid Rain Program: Overview at 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp/overview.html#phases last viewed August 15, 2006.  
16 American Trucking Associations v. EPA, 175 F. 3d 1027, 1055-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999) and 
Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
Whitman v. American 
ntal 
r the District of Columbia and Joint Status Report, September 2004,C.A. 
No. 03-778 (ESH), American Lung Association, et al v. the U.S. Environmental Protection et al. (EPA), U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia.  
18 See EPA’s “Regulatory Actions” Website at http://epa.gov/pm/actions.html
17 Consent agreement, July 2003, C.A. No. 03-778 (ESH), American Lung Association, et al v. the U.S. Environme
Protection et al. (EPA), U.S. District Court fo
 last viewed September 23, 2006. Also 
see 71 Federal Register 27, Thursday, February 9, 2006, pg. 6718 
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Although attainment of the SO2 standard has not been a challenge for most U.S. 
states, there are still many counties of the Eastern U.S. (and some areas of California, 
Montan S 
ile and 
AA has required the 
EPA to  
r 
tions 
he authority to regulate stationary sources 
when th  
 
 
The institutions and processes of the science-policy interface vary in the U.S. between 
ally well defined science-policy 
 and 
 
funding source for relevant research and an organization to create and collate scientific 
a, Colorado, and Texas) that have not attained the PM standard. Since the NAAQ
were established, the state and federal governments have used reductions in both mob
point source emissions to try to attain the standards. Mobile source regulations include those 
on light-duty vehicles (LDV), heavy-duty vehicles (HDV), and on nonroad sources including 
locomotives, marine sources, and equipment like lawnmowers. Stationary source regulations 
include those on power plants and other large industrial facilities.   
There are many examples of federal regulations intended to reduce PM, SO2, and 
other emissions from mobile sources. For example, since 1968 the C
 set standards for the levels of pollutants in the exhaust of gasoline power vehicles
(including cars, light-duty trucks, and SUVs). Beginning in 2004, the Tier 2 Tailpipe 
standards required levels of PM of 0.01 g/mile or lower and also reduced the levels of othe
pollutants allowed in vehicle exhaust. The EPA also implemented Tier 2 sulfur regula
for reformulated gasoline and diesel in 2004.19  
In the case of stationary sources, the CAA generally encourages states to develop 
their own regulations. The CAA gives the EPA t
e interstate transport of pollutants and precursors is a problem. The EPA has used
this authority recently to help states in the Eastern U.S. achieve the PM and ozone NAAQS
by reducing interstate transport of PM, ozone, and their precursors SO2 and NOX: in March
of 2005, the EPA proposed the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR). In response to eleven 
petitions for reconsideration from industry, the EPA agreed to reconsider it in November 
2005. In March of 2006 the EPA determined that CAIR should remain unchanged.20
7.b. Overview of science-policy interfaces 
different situations. The NAAQS process has an unusu
interface because each review of the standards requires a formal knowledge assessment
because the Clean Air Science Advisory Committee (CASAC) is heavily involved.  The 
science-policy interfaces in the cases of the Acid Rain Program and the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule are different from each other and from that for the NAAQS. Congress created the
NAPAP in 1980 to assess the science behind acid rain and its impacts. NAPAP was a 
knowledge and to answer policy questions.  It informed the development of the Acid Rain 
Program, although the knowledge assessment process lacked some important characteristics 
discussed later. The science-policy interface for the Clean Air Interstate Rule did not include 
                                                 
19 See Union of Concerned Scientists, “The Plain English Guide to Tailpipe Standards,” at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_vehicles/vehicles_health/the-plain-english-guide-to-tailpipe-standards.html last viewed 
September 23, 2006. 
20 See U.S. EPA, “Clean Air Interstate Rule: Regulatory Actions,” at 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanairinterstaterule/rule.html last viewed August 15, 2006. 
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a separate organization that helped the EPA review scientific knowledge prior to the 
rulemaking.  
 The details of science-policy interfaces are important for understanding policy 
outcomes. These interfaces are the avenues through which policymakers become informed 
about science and through which increasingly large parts of the justifications for decisions 
are created. This section briefly overviews the science-policy interfaces for the four cases and 
highlights the differences between them.  
 
7.b.i. The NAAQS science-policy interface (Cases: PM and SO2 NAAQS) 
Title I of the CAA mandates the setting of National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants, including SO2 and PM. The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) must set primary standards for each pollutant to protect public health.21 The 
AA also mandates a review of each air quality standard every five years. The standards are 
health-based standards and are ostensibly based on the best-available scientific 
iven 
 
d CASAC 
. The 
ademies 
of Scien  
d 
lve 
                                                
C
understanding of the health effects of ambient air conditions.22 Title I of the CAA 
recognizes that the proper level for each standard cannot possibly be knowable at a g
time due to scientific uncertainty.23 The reviews mean to ameliorate this problem.  
The labor-intensive NAAQS review process involves four offices of the EPA, the 
Clean Air Science Advisory Committee (CASAC), the public, and other government agencies
like the Office of Management and Budget. Section 109 of the 1970 CAA create
specifically for the purpose of aiding the EPA in its periodic review of the NAAQS
CAA requires that CASAC have seven members and contain one medical doctor, one 
representative from a State air quality agency, and one person from the National Ac
ce. Additional CASAC review panels are formed for each NAAQS review since the
amount of work required of CASAC for each pollutant’s review is so large. The CASAC 
NAAQS panels consist of CASAC proper as well as expert “consultants” from academia an
industry. One result of the advisory board requirement is that the EPA must directly invo
at least some non-government scientists in the air quality policy process. 
 
21 The agency can also set secondary standards to protect “welfare” more generally, such as the environment and 
livestock. 
22 CAA §109(b)(1) states that the NAAQS must be based on scientific criteria and allow “an adequate margin of 
safety…requisite to protect the public health.” Also CAA §108(a)(2) states: “Air quality criteria for an air pollutant 
shall accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects 
on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying 
quantities.”  
23 The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce recognized this challenge explicitly in its report on the 
1977 CAAA. It stated that the language in the act was “intended to emphasize the necessarily judgmental element in 
the task of predicting future health risks of present action and to confer upon the Administrator the requisite authority to 
exercise such judgment … the committee does not intend this language as a license for 'crystal ball' speculation. The 
Administrator's judgment must, of course, remain subject to restraints of reasoned decision-making." U.S. Congress, 
House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, House Report No. 95-
294, to accompany H.R. 6161 (95th Congress, lst session) (Washington, D.C.: U S Govt Print Office, 1977) 
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The NAAQS process creates three major documents. These are the Air Quality 
Criteria Document (CD), the Staff Paper (SP), and the Federal Register publications that 
propose and justify the initial and final rulemakings. The Air Quality Criteria Document 
(CD) is a comprehensive science assessment document for which the EPA office The 
National Center for Environmental Assessment24 is responsible. The role of the SP is to 
translat icy 
t 
he 
ulings 
 
ns while still being sufficiently distant to avoid 
being corrupted or coerced. Literature out of Harvard’s Global Environmental Assessment 
Project suggests that, to succeed, knowledge assessments must be credible, salient, and 
e they must be scientifically and technically 
 
ity to 
f the criteria document in the NAAQS review process. The criteria documents 
collate all the relevant science; they are the bulk of the knowledge assessment for the 
 the standard and the dependence of other aspects of the 
 
acy.26
e the CD from a document intended for a scientific audience to one for a lay, pol
audience (NAAQS PRW 2006). Additionally, the SP includes a quantitative risk assessmen
performed by EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. The EPA publishes t
proposed and final rules in the Federal Register and includes their justification for the r
in those documents. CASAC must approve each of the documents with a closure letter. 
Section 207 of CAA also requires that the EPA explain any differences between the NAAQS
rulemaking and CASAC recommendations. 
 
7.b.ii. Knowledge Assessments 
For knowledge assessments to succeed they must tradeoff being tied close to the policy so 
that they address relevant and timely questio
legitimate.25 They must be credible becaus
believable. Saliency is the criteria that a knowledge assessment must address questions that 
are relevant to the policy issue. A knowledge assessment is legitimate if those involved in the
policy process consider it to be fair, or conducted in a manner that accounted for their 
perspective.  
The PM NAAQS reviews 
The PM NAAQS reviews fill all of these criteria, the reviews have maintained credibility and 
relevance. The use of non-EPA scientists and the advisory board, CASAC, lend credibil
the creation o
reviews. The need to update
NAAQS review, like the staff paper, on the criteria document help motivate its timeliness 
and relevance. The staff paper translates the criteria document to a form that is even more 
relevant for policymakers.  A planning process that outlines the chapters of the criteria 
document and the staff paper also assists. The diverse composition of CASAC and the
public comment periods for the criteria document contribute to establishing its legitim
                                                 
24 http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/  
 C., Alcock, Frank, Dickson, Nancy, Eckley, Noelle and Jäger, Jill, "Salience, 
02). KSG 
for further discussion. 
25 Cash, David, Clark, William
Credibility, Legitimacy and Boundaries: Linking Research, Assessment and Decision Making" (November 20
Working Papers Series RWP02-046. 
26 See McCray 2003 and Powell 1997 
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One thing to note, however, is that court orders or Congressional actions motivated
the completion of each successful PM review processes. The 1977 CAA Amendments 
Congress required the EPA to finish the first reviews for all six NAAQS by 1980. This d
not actually motivate the completion of any reviews by 1980 but the PM NAAQS was the 
 
id 
first tha
ourt 
 new reviews.  This helps explain the slowness and lack of reviews for 
the SO  NAAQS.  The American Lung Association and the Environmental Defense Fund 
hallenging the EPA’s 1996 decision not to change the SO2 
 
 
They 
n 
 
ghly credible, salient, legitimate knowledge assessments 
in the case of PM did not prevent political concerns from influencing the results of the SO2 
d SO2 in 1979.  By 
 
t the EPA completed in 1987.27 In 1994 the Federal District Court of Arizona 
ordered the EPA to finish the second review of the PM NAAQS by 1997.28 In a 2004 c
case the American Lung Association again demanded that the EPA complete a PM review 
and the Federal District Court of the District of Columbia ordered the EPA to finish the 
review by 2006.29  
The SO2 NAAQS review 
For the SO2 NAAQS, the court cases brought by interest groups against the EPA did not 
attempt to motivate
2
focused their attention on c
NAAQS. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found, in 1998, that the EPA 
should further review and explain its decision not to establish a new 5-minute NAAQS for
SO2. In response to that remand, the EPA reviewed the information on SO2 and decided, in
2001, to continue with their initial decision not to implement a 5-minute SO2 standard. 
did agree to help states decide whether local conditions warranted this type of standard o
an individual basis.30 Thus, while the SO2 review officially ended in 1996, the EPA’s work on
it did not end until May of 2001.  The EPA announced another review of the SO2 NAAQS 
five years later on May 15, 2006.31  
Comparison of the SO2 and PM NAAQS knowledge assessments 
The assessment processes for the PM and SO2 NAAQS are the same, at least superficially. 
But, the characteristics that led to hi
review. The EPA commenced a joint NAAQS review for both PM an
1982 they had decided to consider the two pollutants separately. The EPA’s argument for 
disconnecting the SO2 and PM reviews was scientific, though its motivation was arguably 
political. The EPA’s political concerns were that the continued joint assessment of PM and 
SO2 would lead to the creation of a strict and costly regulatory program for SO2 through a
                                                 
27 The EPA should have completed all reviews by 1976 but had been completed none of them by 1977. 
28 American Lung Association versus Browner, DC of AZ, October 6, 1994. 
29 Consent agreement, July 2003, C.A. No. 03-778 (ESH), American Lung Association, et al v. the U.S. Environmental 
Protection et al. (EPA), U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and Joint Status Report, September 2004,C.A. 
No. 03-778 (ESH), American Lung Association, et al v. the U.S. Environmental Protection et al. (EPA), U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia. 
30 EPA, “National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Dioxide); Availability of Information,” 
Federal Register 66 (6), January 9, 2001, pg. 1665. (66 FR 1665).  
31 EPA, “Science Assessment for Sulfur Oxides,” Federal Register 71 (93), May 15, 2006, pg. 28023 (71 FR 28023). 
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“backdoor” rather than in a direct manner like the later Acid Rain Program.32 The science a
that time, in subsequent PM reviews, and then later as the motivation for the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule, suggested that types of PM formed by mechanisms involving SO
t 
 and sources of acid 
precipitation” and 2) to “evaluate the environmental, social, and economics effects of acid 
policy-science interface. The 
t 
t and a staff paper with 
eceive; but it is the role of 
the pol  
ess’ 
m without attention to its 
costs an om 
is 
 1990 
991 (NAPAP 1990, 1991), while the Senate and House of Representatives passed the 
                                                
2 were an 
important fraction of the PM pollution that endangers human health. 
7.b.iii. The Acid Rain Program science-policy interface 
In Title VII of the 1980 Acid Precipitation Act (APA), Congress created the National Acid 
Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) to 1) “identify the causes
precipitation.33 The intent of Congress was for NAPAP to be a 
APA stated the intent of Congress to use the results of the NAPAP research program to 
“take action to the extent necessary and practicable” to limit the emissions that are the 
sources of acid rain and to ameliorate acid rain’s harmful effects.34  
 While the NAAQS review process has generally succeeded in transferring undistorted 
knowledge across the science-policy interface, NAPAP did not perform as well. The 
NAAQS process balances the need for separate, credible scientific knowledge assessmen
and connected policy advice by formulating both a criteria documen
those respective purposes. In advance of April 1990 when Congress devised and passed the 
Acid Rain Program, NAPAP was not able to balance these tasks.  
NAPAP focused on the science side of the science-policy interface. Their 1984 
report stated, “Decision makers, not researchers, must decide the level of scientific 
information necessary for decision making. For example, scientists have the task of relating 
the response of ecosystems to the amount of acid deposition they r
icy maker to determine the acceptable level of response … considering the social
costs and benefits in addition to other factors” (NAPAP 1984). 
Studies criticize NAPAP because it did not address policy questions.35 These 
criticisms focus on NAPAP’s failure to analyze alternative policy choices and issues like the 
relative costs and benefits of different proposals for SO2 reduction targets prior to Congr
decision in April of 1990. Congress passed the Acid Rain Progra
d benefits. This is evident because, based on NAPAP’s benefit-cost analysis fr
September of 1990, the program’s benefits would not have outweighed its anticipated 
costs.36
In accordance with its 1984 statement, NAPAP did create and fund new, peer-
reviewed and published research about acid rain and its environmental effects. But, even th
aspect of NAPAP’s was not timely. It published its first major reports in September of
and in 1
 
32 Powell 1999 pg. 242 reference to endnote 5, pg. 263 
33 42 USC § 8901 
34 42 USC § 8901 
35 See Rubin et al. 1992 and Herrick 2000 
36 Portney 1990  
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Clean A er 
prior to 
rogram: 
at could come from reductions in SO2 and the sulfate compounds that are both 
types o
 
ific basis of the Acid Rain Program (NAPAP 1998). 
NAPA  
 
is case, the EPA’s authority stems from the Clean 
Air Act. The CAA gives the EPA the authority to regulate the emission of criteria pollutants 
S non-attainment.39 
extent nitrogen oxides, will result in the desired air quality improvements; 
4) igh the costs and that CAIR 
is a particularly cost-effective way to achieve the emission reductions. 
                                                
ir Act Amendments in April of 1990 and the President signed them in Novemb
1990. Although NAPAP did not evaluate alternative policy choices, it did succeed in 
enabling informal communication between Congress and scientists. This informal 
conversation may have helped make the implementation of the Acid Rain Program politically 
possible.37
In addition to their hesitancy to consider direct policy issues, NAPAP’s work 
1990 did not focus on or even anticipate the most import impact of the Acid Rain P
its health benefits. By 1987, the NAAQS process for PM had recognized the potential health 
benefits th
f PM and components of acid rain. But, in NAPAP’s 1996 report, they highlighted 
these health benefits in their table on “Selected Policy-Relevant Developments Since 1990” 
(NAPAP 1998, pg. 44). It is these health benefits – largely ignored by NAPAP in 1990 – that 
have been the ex post justification for the Acid Rain Program. They have dominated the 
program’s estimated benefits.38  
Congress reauthorized NAPAP in under Title IX of the 1990 CAAA and their 
subsequent activities have been more policy focused. In 1993 NAPAP adopted a framework, 
called the Tracking and Analysis Framework, for their assessments of the ongoing costs,
benefits, effectiveness, and scient
P produced reports in 1998 and in 2005. Although these reports suggest that the
benefits of the Acid Rain Program far surpass its costs, NAPAP has still not recommended 
changes in the targets of the Acid Rain. 
7.b.iv. The Clean Air Interstate Rule science-policy interface 
CAIR is not a congressionally mandated program and the U.S. legal system requires the EPA
to justify their authority to regulate. In th
from stationary sources when interstate transport is a cause of NAAQ
The EPA’s justification for CAIR has six components, as discussed in the EPA’s preamble 
to the rule.40 The four of these that span the science-policy interface are: 
 
1) Non-attainment areas for PM2.5 exist in the northeastern United States and 
interstate transport contributes to non-attainment; 
2) Analysis indicates that achievable emissions reductions of SO2, and to some 
3) Analysis indicates that the regulation’s incentives will have the intended effect on 
emissions from the targeted sources; and 
That the benefits of improving air quality will outwe
 
37 Herrick 2000 
38 See Burtraw et. al. 1998 and Chesnut and Mills 2005 
39 The EPA has the authority to regulate under CAA §110(a)(2)(D). 
40 40 CFR Parts 51, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, and 96 
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To man
analyse
establis
rational for ntrations 
f PM2.5, the EPA references the 2004 PM Criteria Document. They also generally reference 
 
 to 
1. Did the mandated reviews of the programs occur?  
2. Did planned adaptation occur? That is, did the reviews lead to a successful 
ews lead to 
justifications?  
 signs solicit the collection of 
5. 
led reviews?    
 
Of these five, the third deserves more explanation.  
rein c rtainty. 
If polic cisions have correctly 
nticipated the trends in science. Success in this area does not require perfection, especially if 
inty. If each policy decision in a series of 
adaptiv
ation 
 
requirements in all three major 
euv the 
s that supported the PM NAAQS and the Acid Rain Program. The EPA did not 
er through the science-policy interface for CAIR, the EPA borrowed from 
h separate entities to review the science behind CAIR. In defense of their overall 
 regulating SO2 and NOX emissions as a way to decrease ambient conce
o
a report by NARSTO, a public-private partnership that aims to improve Air Quality 
Management in North America, called “Particulate Matter Science for Policy Makers – A
NARSTO Assessment” (February 2003). EPA performed the modeling and data analysis
support the other aspects of CAIR’s justification in house. 
 
8. Section 3: Analysis of timeline of PM policy decisions 
This section analyzes the cases with respect to five outcomes related to adaptation.  
 
reassessment of policy decisions and their justification and did the revi
logically consistent changes in policy?  
3. Have subsequent scientific findings reinforced or been consistent with the decisions’ 
4. Did the recognition of uncertainties or early warning
data for use in future decisions?  
Did adaptation occur? That is, did changes to the policy occur based on new 
knowledge but not as a result of schedu
It is a desirable outcome for advances in science, an ever-changing process, to 
for e the original basis for policy decisions. Policy decisions are made under unce
y decisions are consistent with new science, then the de
a
adaptation is employed as a tool to deal with uncerta
e decisions is made based on the best available information, then as more 
uncertainties are resolved, both science and policy should converge toward an acceptable 
outcome.  If policy decisions are not based on or adapted to the best available inform
then it is more likely that future understanding will show that the justifications for those 
policies were not correct and the outcomes far from ideal. 
8.a. Planned adaptation and successful reviews 
Within these cases, the search for instances of planned adaptation used as a means to deal 
with uncertainty yields only one successful example: the PM NAAQS. This is true despite
the existence of congressionally mandated scientific review 
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cases.  The requirements for the PM and SO2 NAAQS are identical: the CAA requires five-
e 
S, 
t, the program. CAIR is too new to analyze. 
That multiple, explicit reviews of the PM standards occurred differentiates case, although the 
 until 1996 and the EPA made no change to the standard. The SO2 
NAAQ
.  In 
 
hese 
S 
in most
vise 
 
ponse to the disconnect 
betwee  
nts 
                                                
year reviews of the air quality standards and their scientific bases.  In the case of the Acid 
Rain Program, Title IX of the CAA Amendments reauthorized NAPAP so that it could 
review the progress and effectiveness of the Acid Rain Program (including the cap-and-trad
program) and any new applicable science.  
A cursory glance at the timelines show that the mandated reviews for the PM 
NAAQS occurred more often (three times) than for the other cases. For the SO2 NAAQ
the EPA conducted one review. NAPAP produced reports reviewing the Acid Rain Program 
but these were not intended to alter, or adap
reviews occurred more slowly than required and were motivated by court orders on two of 
three occasions.  
The PM NAAQS reviews resulted in changes to the air quality standard and this 
further distinguishes it. The EPA began a joint review of the SO2 and PM NAAQS in 1979. 
While the PM NAAQS review ended in 1987 with an update in the standards, the SO2 
review did not end
S has never been changed. The Acid Rain Program targets have also never been 
changed. CAIR can be seen as a response to the need to update the Acid Rain Program. 
It is not a requirement of successful planned adaptation that policies be changed 41
the case of the SO2 NAAQS, the lack of changes to the standard between 1979 and the
present is not consistent with the implementation of the Acid Rain Program or CAIR. T
programs require more reductions in SO2 emissions than needed to attain the SO2 NAAQ
 states. That another program would be needed to achieve extra emission reductions 
is inconsistent with the mandate that the SO2 NAAQS should use the latest science to de
air quality standards to protect the public health and welfare with a margin of safety. Because 
the SO2 reductions mandated in CAIR are based on the PM NAAQS, the SO2 NAAQS 
results are also inconsistent with those for the PM NAAQS.  
The Acid Rain Program is now celebrated as a success because its benefits outweigh 
its costs. But this success should be considered an accident as the program was not initially 
designed to achieve these acclaimed benefits nor has the program been updated to reflect
them.  The Clean Air Interstate Rule, of 2005, is the EPA’s res
n the politically accepted knowledge tying SO2 emissions to health effects and the lack
of changes to the Acid Rain Program. Although the mechanisms through which SO2 
emissions harm public health are still uncertain, the scientific evidence of a connection is 
strong enough to have earned the causal chain acceptance in the PM NAAQS assessme
 
41 However, it is likely that given new relevant information, one will prefer to change ones strategy. Students of game 
theory will remember the Monty Hall game. 
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and as the claimed ex post justification for the Acid Rain Program’s required SO2 emission 
reductions.42
8.a.i. Updates to PM standard have been consistent with new science 
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The changes to the PM standard have been consistent with the progress of science
knowledge assessments for the PM NAAQS reviews have shown room for further 
improvement, but they have not shown that the updates to the PM NAAQS were in
The original indicator for PM was total suspended particulates (TSP). The major decision of
the 1989 review was to change the indicator to focus on particles less than 10 microns in 
diameter (PM10). During the 1979 to 1987 review, the EPA considered science that sugges
that a separate standard for particles with diameters less than 2.5 microns (PM2.5) was 
warranted. In the next review, which ended in 1997, the EPA implemented separate 
standards for PM10 and PM2.5.  Recently, in September of 2006, the EPA made the da
standard for PM2.5 more stringent. They also repealed the annual PM10 standard but 
maintained the more stringent daily PM10 standard. 
The NAAQS reviews and decisions have ant
anding that particles with smaller diameters are more harmful to public health than
larger particles. This trend is now appreciated internationally.43 Particles with diameters 
between 2.5 and 10 microns do have some impact on health; hence the EPA’s decisions 
implement a PM10 standard in 1987 and to maintain it are not in error. 
The EPA, somewhat inconsistently, formally rejected the PM2.5 indicator in 1987 fo
er of reasons that were still valid in 1997 when the EPA imposed a PM2.5 indicator.44 
The agency stressed the uncertainty around the science supporting a PM2.5 standard in 1987 
(EPA 1982 CD, See Appendix for details). Some of these uncertainties were resolved 
because of new epidemiological studies by the 1997 review, but some were not. For ex
the toxicological mechanisms through which different types of PM impact health are still 
uncertain (EPA 2004 CD). The EPA justified their PM2.5 standard in 1996 largely on new 
epidemiological studies and on evidence that the two size fractions (PM2.5 and PM2.5-10) var
 
42 For a summaries of the benefits of the Acid Rain Program see Burtraw et. al. 1998 and Chesnut and Mills 2005. For 
summaries of the uncertainties surrounding the connections between SO2 and PM and health effects see the EPA’s 
Criteria Documents (EPA 1982 CD, 1996 CD, 2004 CD). 
43 See for example, World Health Organization, “WHO air quality guidelines global update 2005” Report on a working 
group meeting, Bonn, Germany, 18-20 October 2005. 
44 The EPA’s logic in the 1987 Federal Register publication justifying their new PM10 standard stated, first, that the 
EPA rejected the PM2.5 standard because the respiratory tract sees the deposition of a mixture of PM2.5 and PM10 in 
both the tracheobronchial and alveolar regions: “The mixing of these size fractions in the respiratory tract and the 
heterogeneity within each fraction therefore blurs the distinction between the fractions in terms of health effects”.44 
Second, PM10 is associated with various health problems: they believed that not all health effects come from PM2.5 
alone. Also, a PM2.5 was standard not warranted in addition to the PM10 standard because 1) fine PM is 40 to 70% of 
PM10 so PM10 standard does cover fine PM to some extent, 2) epidemiological studies do not separate the effects of 
PM2.5 and PM10 fractions so there is not a basis for a PM2.5 standard; and 3) it may be more “appropriate to consider the 
addition of chemical-specific (e.g., acid aerosols) standards rather than a fine [PM2.5] particle standard in future primary 
standard revision”. From EPA’s final decision on the PM NAAQS in 1987, as published in the Federal Register (52 FR 
24634, July 1, 1987) 
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separately in time and space. Some of this evidence was already available in the earlier review 
(EPA 1982 CD).  
It is possible that the EPA hesitated to introduce a PM2.5 standard in 1987 because it 
would have required more costly emission reductions from industry than the PM10 
standard.45 The uncertainty around PM2.5 was more important as industry would be more 
motivated to contest a PM2.5 standard. The SO2 abatement that took place under the Acid 
Rain Program between 1990 and 1995 (which reduced PM2.5 levels) and new studies 
implicating PM2.5 then allowed the EPA to impose a PM2.5 standard in 1996.  
The supposition that the EPA understood that industry would have fought fiercely 
against the PM2.5 standards in 1987 is supported by the attack on the PM2.5 standards that 
occurred starting in 1996 when the EPA first proposed a PM2.5 standard. Industry tried to 
discredit the new science that supported the PM2.5 standards in 1996 – in particular, the 
Harvard Six Cities Study.46 They also sponsored a public campaign that, among other things, 
created television ads claiming that the EPA’s rules were so strict that they would prohibit 
barbecues and fireworks.47  
By 1996, the evidence that PM2.5 was a problem supported the EPA’s PM2.5 
standards despite industry’s fierce opposition. The controversial Six Cities Study and the 
American Cancer Society study that linked small particle (e.g. PM2.5) pollution to 
cardiovascular disease were particularly important.48 The Six Cities Study was later validated 
and the EPA’s PM2.5 withstood court challenges.  
8.a.ii. Resolving uncertainties with data collection and creation 
By 1987, the EPA had clearly recognized that a PM2.5 standard might eventually be necessary. 
One notable exception to the success of the PM NAAQS review process is that the EPA did 
not start monitoring PM2.5 in 1987 as a result of this suspicion. The criteria document from 
the 1996 PM review often bemoans the lack of monitoring data on PM2.5.  It is unclear why 
the EPA did not undertake to collect data on PM2.5 starting in 1987. Perhaps it was the cost 
or their unwillingness to consider a PM2.5 standard at that time for fear of industry objection 
invalidating their other decisions in the review. On the other hand, the PM NAAQS review 
process did create funding mechanisms for further PM research and the EPA accelerated 
their PM research starting in 1997.49
8.b. Influences on adaptation outcomes 
Court cases and challenges to scientific justifications motivated by private interests and 
interest group politics played a role in determining outcomes in all four cases. For the PM 
                                                 
45 Powell 1999 pg. 242 reference to endnote 5, pg. 263 
46 See Laura Johannes, “Pollution Study Sparks Debate Over Secret Data,” The Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1997, 
Dockery 1993, and Pope 1995 
47 See Hillary J. Johnson, “The Next Battle Over Clean Air,” Rolling Stone, January 2001. 
48 Pope 1995 
49 See the EPA’s, “Particulate Matter Research Program,” at 
http://www.epa.gov/pmresearch/pm_research_accomplishments/ last viewed October 2, 2006.  
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NAAQS, these issues only caused relatively short delays. For the SO2 NAAQS, they were 
overwhelming and caused the first review to effectively last from 1979 to 2001. For the Acid 
Rain Program, these factors linked with a lack of salient knowledge assessments caused 
NAPAP to incorrectly anticipate the program’s effects by missing its biggest return.  Politics, 
although focused on the President’s Clear Skies Program, which was under consideration 
between 2001 and 2003, also delayed the implementation of CAIR. 
8.b.i. Delays in the PM NAAQS 
In the first review of the PM NAAQS, two years separated CASAC’s approval of the criteria 
document in 1982 and the EPA’s initial proposal of the PM10 standard in 1984. As discussed 
in the timeline, American Steel and Iron was able to delay implementation of the PM10 
standard by three years with a lawsuit that argued that the proposed rulemaking for PM did 
not “accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge” as the CAA required.50 Industry 
attempted to delay or inhibit the adoption of the PM2.5 standard in 1996 as well. As discussed 
above, the PM NAAQS process also withstood this challenge. With reference to the tradeoff 
between the transparency of models and the challenges of consensus processes, it is 
interesting to note that the 1984 to 1987 delay was caused by a requirement that the EPA 
consider all relevant science in an open manner. In the next review, industry was able to 
attack the Six Cities Study because it was not transparent – the Harvard researchers did not 
want to share their data so that their results could be validated due to privacy concerns for 
the cohorts they studied. 
8.b.ii. Delays in the SO2 NAAQS 
The SO2 NAAQS suffered longer delays due to legal challenges. The legal challenges in this 
case again took issue with the EPA’s science.  But, it was the American Lung Association 
and the Environmental Defense Fund who brought the challenge. Industry had no incentive 
to spend time and money resisting the EPA’s decision. First, the decision not to change the 
standard was in their favor because the SO2 NAAQS was not a binding constraint on 
emissions due to the Acid Rain Program. Also, the public interest groups were causing delay 
so there was little need to worry that the standard would be reviewed again.  
This long delay occurred over a relatively small issue of whether a 5-minute SO2 
standard was needed. In the mean time the SO2 NAAQS became logically inconsistent with 
the other regulatory and policy programs. This delay lasted for about 22 years (from 1979 to 
2001), or 27 years since a review of the SO2 NAAQS is just now beginning in 2006. It will be 
interesting to see if the review that is currently starting for the SO2 NAAQS will improve its 
logical consistency with the PM NAAQS, the Acid Rain Program, and CAIR.  
 
                                                 
50 CAA §108(a)(2) 
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8.b.iii. The Acid Rain Program’s health benefits 
Although NAPAP did not explicitly recognize or estimate the potential health benefits of the 
Acid Rain Program before 1990, Congress was aware of the connection.  For example, 
newspaper editorials from 1987 suggest that at least some members of the Senate believed 
that reducing SO2 emissions would provide health benefits. A March 22 Washington Post 
editorial stated, “Pollution has already been cut to a point at which it no longer appears to 
threaten human health. Acid rain certainly kills aquatic life in lakes … but beyond that, at the 
levels permitted by present regulation, it's hard to show much further damage.”51 But, a 
senator from Maine responded to this with: “It is not true … that beyond the killing of 
aquatic life, ‘it’s hard to show much further damage.’” He then citing a hearing of the Senate 
environmental protection subcommittee where the American Lung Association, the 
American Public Health Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics “unanimously 
recommended that Congress take action to reduce acid rain – based solely on health 
considerations.”52  
Enthusiastic celebration over the Acid Rain Program’s success followed the initial 
controversy and the positive outcome gave lawmakers little incentive to update the program 
based on the new information about its considerable health benefits. Congress implemented 
the Acid Rain Program at a time when NAPAP’s analyses indicated that its estimated costs 
overpowered its estimated benefits.53  But, scholars and policymakers alike eventually came 
to see that its benefits did far outweigh its costs. 54 They also found that its novel cap-and-
trade approach worked well. On the basis of benefits and costs, more stringent targets for 
the program were justified.  The program was seen as a success and it was not until around 
2003 that momentum for further reductions began to build. 
8.b.iv. Clean Air Interstate Rule 
The Administration first tried to update the Acid Rain Program targets based on PM health 
information with its Clear Skies bill, which started taking shape in 2001.  Clear Skies did not 
pass through Congress, largely because of controversy about whether or not targets for 
reducing green house gasses to address climate change should be included. As discussed in 
the later section on the transparency of models, controversies over scientific models also 
added turmoil to the debate over the Administration’s Clear Skies proposal.55
The recent implementation of the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) is a step that 
makes existing regulation more consistent with the science reviewed by the knowledge 
assessments that lead to updates the PM NAAQS. If the benefits of the Acid Rain Program 
                                                 
51 Editorial, “How Much for Acid Rain?”The Washington Post, 22 March 1987. 
52 George J. Mitchell, “Acid Rain: The Damage Continues,” The Washington Post, 2 April 1987. Emphasis in original. 
53 See Portney 1990  
54 Burtraw, D., Krupnick, A., Mansur, E., Austin, D., Farrell, D., (1998) “Costs and benefits of reducing air pollutants 
related to acid rain,” Contemporary Economic Policy 16(4), 379-400 and Chestnut, L.G. and D.M. Mills, “A fresh look 
at the benefits and costs of the U.S. acid rain program,” Journal of Environmental Management 77, 2005 pgs 252-266 
55 For a good summary of the issues see David Whitman, “Partly Sunny,” Washington Monthly, December 2004.  
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are from the health benefits of reducing PM through reductions in SO2, then CAIR is 
justified. However, even if one takes this as a successful adaptation of regulatory programs 
for SO2 to new information, it represents a slower convergence to new science than for the 
PM NAAQS. NAPAP and others recognized the health information by around 1997 but the 
Acid Rain Program’s second phase targets for 2000 were not updated accordingly. The issues 
surrounding the epidemiological studies that the EPA’s addition of a PM2.5 standard to the 
NAAQS made contentious were resolved by 2000 with the reanalysis of the Six Cities Study.  
8.c. Strong incentives to surface information for PM NAAQS 
Mandated reviews, interest group court cases, and successful knowledge assessment all 
helped push the PM NAAQS reviews forward, but after 1990 there were also strong 
incentives for policymakers and scientists to surface information about the health effects of 
PM2.5. The Acid Rain Program created a strong incentive, external to the PM NAAQS 
process itself, for this information to surface.   
Prior to the Acid Rain Program, there were not strong incentives for the EPA to 
divulge or highlight the evidence of the detrimental health effects of PM2.5. In fact, they had 
reasons to avoid stressing this because of the likelihood that industry would fiercely resist a 
PM2.5 standard. In their 1979 to 1987 review of the PM NAAQS, the EPA downplayed the 
PM2.5 evidence by exaggerating the uncertainties around the evidence that supported 
choosing PM2.5 as an indicator (see Appendix B).  
 After the implementation of the Acid Rain Program, the EPA, NAPAP, Congress, 
interest groups, and academics all had a reason to establish the health impacts of PM2.5 and 
their connection to SO2 emissions: they all wanted the Acid Rain Program to succeed. The 
program was Congress, the EPA, NAPAP’s creation. Accolades, political capital and 
monetary support came with its success. The EPA and academics had supported the use of a 
cap-and-trade program to reduce SO2 emissions in the Acid Rain Program because of its 
theoretical promise to reduce the costs of abating emissions, especially compared to 
traditional command and control regulations. The program’s success opened doors for 
advances in other regulations and in academic studies. Environmental and public health 
groups did not initially support the cap-and-trade approach but, independently of the acid 
rain, they wanted PM2.5 levels reduced. 
After gaining some experience with compliance under the Acid Rain Program, 
industry realized that the costs of complying with a cap-and-trade program are lower than 
for traditional regulation, especially when initial allocations of permits were given to them 
freely. Then, they too had reason to desire the continued success of the Acid Rain Program 
so that future regulations would be modeled after it.  
 In 1998 Congress acted on their desire for the generation and divulgence of 
information about PM2.5 by mandating and funding the EPA to accelerate research on 
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particulate matter and the mitigation of its health effects.56 As experience with NAPAP 
shows, however, large amounts of funding alone cannot guarantee that policy actions will 
respond to the new scientific information or that relevant work will be performed. But, the 
EPA now has further incentives to surface information about the relationship between SO2 
emissions and harmful PM levels because this relationship is the basis for CAIR. 
 
8.d. Anticipation 
8.d.i. Transparency of models 
The U.S. cases provide some examples of when the lack of transparency in modeling or 
scientific processes provided ammunition for industry, or interest groups, to fight the 
implementation of a policy. The controversies over the Six Cities Study57 and over CAIR 
(discussed below) are examples. The cases also provide one example in NAPAP where an 
open, consensus approach to scientific knowledge assessment led to the “watering down” of 
science and an ineffective knowledge assessment.58 It is difficult to draw conclusions from 
these examples. Attaining the correct balance of participation and transparency on one side, 
and policy relevance on the other is a challenge but the examples do tend to stress the 
importance of transparency because whenever secrecy has been present, it has been used to 
cause delays.  
8.d.ii. Controversy over models in Clear Skies and the Clean Air Interstate Rule  
Lack of transparency in the modeling of the effectiveness of the proposed Clear Skies 
Program that preceded the Clean Air Interstate Rule helped public interest groups defeat 
Clear Skies. In an interesting twist, starting around 2002 public interest groups like the 
American Lung Association and Environmental Defense among others, decided not to 
support Clear Skies. While the root of their unhappiness with Clear Skies was the lack of 
targets for reductions in carbon emissions, they tried to discredit Clear Skies by claiming that 
the Administration was heavily influenced by industry and that Clear Skies would actually 
weaken the Clean Air Act targets for reducing SO2 and NOX.59  
                                                 
56 See the EPA’s Particulate Matter Research webpage at http://www.epa.gov/pmresearch/ last viewed September 22, 
2006. 
57 See Laura Johannes, “Pollution Study Sparks Debate Over Secret Data,” The Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1997 and 
Hillary J. Johnson, “The Next Battle Over Clean Air,” Rolling Stone, January 2001. A reanalysis of the study that 
confirmed its results concerns alleviated the problem, but not until 2000. See Reanalysis of the Harvard Six Cities 
Study and the American Cancer Society Study of Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality.  A Special Report of the 
Institute's Particle Epidemiology Reanalysis Project. Final version, July 2000 at http://www.healtheffects.org/pubs-
special.htm last viewed January 5, 2006. 
58 For a complete description see Herrick 2000 
59 For example, they created the website “SaveTheCleanAirAct.org” that suggested that Clear Skies would completely 
gut the Clean Air Act.  
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The ability of these groups to claim that Clear Skies would gut the Clean Air Act 
stemmed from a misleading EPA presentation from September 2001.60 In a presentation to 
the Edison Electric Institute, the EPA tried to make the Clean Air Act look stringent so that 
industry would support Clear Skies. The EPA created a “straw-man” business-as-usual 
scenario, using modeling that was both not transparent and dishonest, which suggested that 
Clear Skies would be much less expensive for industry than the planned increases of 
stringency under the Clean Air Act. But, their characterization of the Clean Air Act was not 
accurate; Clear Skies would have called for emission reductions beyond those required under 
the CAA’s Acid Rain Program. The latter called for a cap of about 9 million tons on SO2 by 
2010 and Clear Skies capped SO2 at 4.5 million tons in 2010 and 3 million tons in 2018. 
Further, more credible, modeling of Clear Skies that showed that it would cause reductions 
was not believed after this controversy. 
The flawed, nontransparent modeling in the EPA’s presentation to the Edison 
Electric Institute provided the public interest groups with ammunition to oppose Clear 
Skies. This contributed to delays in adaptation of the Acid Rain Program. The EPA used the 
Clean Air Interstate Rule as a means to reduce the caps on SO2 and NOX emissions – to 
update the Acid Rain Program. But, this took over two years to pass after 2003 and is only 
germane to the eastern United States.  
The models the EPA used to justify the Clean Air Interstate Rule were also 
controversial, but less so. The EPA states in the Preamble to the rule that models show that 
widespread PM2.5 non-attainment will occur without the rule and that it will mitigate a large 
fraction of the non-attainment areas by 2010 and more by 2015. The EPA used air quality 
models to simulate base year and future concentrations of PM2.5 with and without the 
regulation. The simulations include a test case that compares a back-cast for 1996 to 
observed data. They also include a future baseline case that estimates the extent of non-
attainment if CAIR or another action were not taken. The model the EPA originally used for 
this process is called, “Regional Model for Simulating Aerosols and Deposition” 
(REMSAD). It is a photochemical grid model that uses atmospheric specie mass continuity 
equations.61   
The EPA received public comments to their proposal of CAIR that REMSAD was 
outdated and not peer-reviewed and that 1996 was not a good base-line year because so 
many more monitoring data are available for later years.62 Although the EPA states that it 
does not necessarily agree with these criticisms, it also used another model in response to the 
comments, the “Community Multiscale Air Quality Model (CMAQ)”. This model is publicly 
available, peer-reviewed and “state-of-the-science”. The EPA used 2001 data for CMAQ 
                                                 
60 This discussion is based on an extensive article on this issue: David Whitman, “Partly Sunny,” Washington Monthly, 
December 2004.   
61 Details on this model are available in “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Air Quality Modeling Technical Support 
Document” (NPR AQMTSD) 
62 CAIR final preamble, page 369.  40 CFR 51, 72-4,77-8, 96 
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tests and added seasonal calculations of air quality to its baseline analyses in response to 
these comments.  
 
9. Conclusions 
9.a. A return to the questions posed in the introduction 
As a means of conclusion, return to the questions posed in the introduction that aim to 
understand whether certain practices at the science-policy interface made the decisions in 
one case more robust than those in the others.  
9.a.i. Which processes have helped facilitate the assimilation and surfacing of 
relevant information?  
In this sample of cases, the successful use of planned adaptation in the case of PM air quality 
helped facilitate the assimilation of new information. Comparisons of the PM case to the 
SO2 air quality case and the Acid Rain Program show that many things must go right for 
planned adaptation to succeed. In particular, high quality knowledge assessments, incentives 
for information to surface, and interest group lawsuits pressuring review helped planned 
adaptation to succeed in the case of U.S. PM air quality standards.  
A less successful knowledge assessment in the case of NAPAP resulted in severe 
underestimation of the benefits of the Acid Rain Program. Politically and economically 
motivated arguments that took the shape of disputes over science and models slowed 
attempts to adapt that the Acid Rain Program once the new information surfaced.  
 
9.a.ii. Which processes reduced the nastiness of fights over the science used to 
justify policy options? 
In all cases, there were fights over policy options that took the form of disputes over science 
and models. These were the most vicious in the cases of the PM2.5 air quality standards and 
the Clear Skies program. The stakes in these cases were arguably higher than those in the 
others. The PM2.5 standard imposed higher costs on industry than did the PM10 standards. 
Albeit retrospectively, the PM2.5 standard has justified the Acid Rain Program and its cuts in 
emissions. The stakes were high for public interest groups in the case of Clear Skies; they felt 
that pushing the issue of carbon dioxide reductions was a large enough issue that it was 
worth sacrificing improvements in air quality to take a hard line on the issue of Climate 
Change. 
Could the nastiness of fights have been reduced in these cases? In the case of PM2.5, 
had the data of the Six Cities Study not been secret industry may have had less ammunition 
with which to question the credibility of the scientists. But, industry eventually won in the 
Washington D.C. District court on a legal issue of whether the EPA had overstepped its 
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authority by creating a PM2.5 standard. This lawsuit escalated to the Supreme Court, which 
upheld the EPA’s PM2.5 standard. It appears unlikely that more transparent science or 
models could have prevented this escalation.  
Some evidence does suggest that increased transparency reduces the nastiness of 
fights over models and science. In the case of Clear Skies, the misleading representation of 
modeling on the part of the EPA contributed to fights over science. This was clearly 
avoidable with honest, transparent representation of knowledge. In support of the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule, the EPA responded early to criticism about the quality of their modeling by 
adopting a publicly available, peer-reviewed modeling platform. This seems to have quelled 
further criticisms, at least for now. 
 
9.a.iii. Has planned adaptation enabled robust policy decisions? 
There are many reasons that policies tend not to change overtime. In most cases, there are 
incentives for policymakers to exaggerate certainty in support of their attempts to anticipate 
the impacts of policies. If they then acknowledge that original policies were wrong, they will 
be undercutting their own credibility. Industry opposition can lead to delays in policy 
changes. Interest groups’ desires for different or more strict standards can do the same. 
Political turmoil can also cause delays. Knowledge assessment processes are key in 
promoting change; policies can lock-in if there is no avenue through which their targets and 
effects can be readily and credibly reanalyzed. 
The forces that typically result in the lock-in of policy decisions were present in the 
PM NAAQS case. For example, in 1997 EPA Administrator Browner sat before Congress 
and supported the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS by saying, “Clearly, the best available science shows 
that the previous standards were not adequately protecting Americans … These updated 
standards are based on more than 250 of the latest, best scientific studies on ozone and PM 
– all of them published, peer-reviewed, fully-debated and thoroughly analyzed by [CASAC]. 
We’re talking literally peer review of peer review of peer review. It is good science. It is solid 
science.” In addition, industry clearly did not support the adoption of a PM2.5 standard.  
The ability of the PM NAAQS program to respond to uncertainty with planned 
adaptation – in the face of the normal opposing forces – stems from an unusual confluence 
of positive influences. The NAAQS knowledge assessment process is solid. Public interest 
groups supported the updates to the standard and the mandated review provisions of the 
CAA allowed them to encourage the reviews with court cases. Additionally, there were 
strong external incentives for information about the health effects of PM2.5 to surface. It was 
this confluence of factors that helped compel the PM2.5 standards to change. These 
motivations may help explain why the U.S. PM2.5 standards are more stringent than those in 
Europe. 
For the other cases, the negative influences were stronger than the positive. For the 
SO2 NAAQS, the Acid Rain Program and PM NAAQS diverted political and public interest. 
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The court case fighting the EPA’s 1996 decision not to revise the SO2 NAAQS also caused 
delay. Additionally, the EPA did not desire to link the SO2 and PM standards in 1987 
because that would have forced the earlier adoption of a PM2.5 standard. For the Acid Rain 
Program, NAPAP’s failure to address highly policy-relevant issues prior to the program’s 
implementation was one problem. Another was that the motivation of most parties was to 
emphasize the program’s success, not the ways that it should be altered.  
Can the positive factors that promoted successful planned adaptation in the PM case 
be emulated in other situations? The mandating of scheduled reviews is not unique to the 
PM case, neither is the framework for high quality knowledge assessment. These two factors 
are possible to reproduce. Providing incentives for policymakers to recognize uncertainty, 
surface information, and change past decisions appears difficult as does ensuring that 
interest groups push for change rather than delay it. At the least, these cases show that these 
are the two big challenges to keep in mind if processes to institutionalize planned adaptation 
are desired.  
 
 
 
References 
Burtraw, D., Krupnick, A., Mansur, E., Austin, D., Farrell, D., 1998 “Costs and benefits of 
reducing air pollutants related to acid rain,” Contemporary Economic Policy 16(4), 379-400. 
 
Chestnut, L.G. and D.M. Mills, 2005 “A fresh look at the benefits and costs of the U.S. acid rain 
program,” Journal of Environmental Management 77, pgs 252-266 
 
Dockery, D. W., C. A. Pope III, X. Xu, John D. Spengler, James H. Ware, Martha E. Fay, 
Benjamin G. Ferris, Jr., and Frank E. Speizer,  1993,  "An Association between Air  
Pollution and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities," The New England Journal of Medicine,  
329(24), pp. 1753-1759.  
 
EPA CD 1996, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Air quality criteria for particulate 
matter,” Research Triangle Park, NC: National Center for Environmental Assessment-RTP 
Office; report nos. EPA/600/P-95/001aF-cF. 3v. 
 
EPA SP 1996, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Review of the national ambient air 
quality standards for particulate matter: policy assessment of scientific and technical 
information,” OAQPS staff paper. Research Triangle Park, NC: Office of Air Quality 
Planning and Standards; report no. EPA/452/R-96-013. Available from: NTIS, Springfield, 
VA; PB97-115406REB.  
 
EPA 1986a, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Second addendum to air quality 
  59 
TAUC Background Papers – Anticipation and Adaptation in Particulate Matter Policy 3 October 2006 
criteria for particulate matter and sulfur oxides (1982): assessment of newly available health 
effects information,” Research Triangle Park, NC: Office of Health and Environmental 
Assessment, Environmental Criteria and Assessment Office; EPA report no. EPA-600/8-
86-020F. Available from: NTIS, Springfield, VA; PB87-176574.  
 
EPA 1986b, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Review of the national ambient air 
quality standards for particulate matter: updated assessment of scientific and technical 
information, addendum to the 1982 OAQPS staff paper. Research Triangle Park, NC: Office 
of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Strategies and Air Standards Division; report no. 
EPA/450/05-86/012. Available from: NTIS, Springfield, VA; PB87-176871/XAB.  
 
EPA CD 1982, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Air quality criteria for particulate 
matter and sulfur oxides,” Research Triangle Park, NC: Office of Health and Environmental 
Assessment, Environmental Criteria and Assessment Office; EPA report no. EPA-600/8-
82-029aF-cF. 3v. Available from: NTIS, Springfield, VA; PB84-156777. 
 
EPA SP 1982, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Review of the national ambient air 
quality standards for particulate matter: assessment of scientific and technical information,” 
Research Triangle Park, NC: Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Strategies and 
Air Standards Division; report no. EPA-450/5-82-001. Available from: NTIS, Springfield, 
VA; PB82-177874. 
 
Herrick, D., 2000 “Predictive Modeling of Acid Rain: Obstacles to Generating Useful 
Information” in Sarewitz, D., R.A. Pielke, R. Byerly (Eds.), Prediction: Science, Decision Making, 
and the Future of Nature, Island Press. 
 
McCray, L., 2003, “Planned Adaptation In Federal Regulation: An Initial Assessment of 
Adaptability in US Health and Safety Regulations,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Center for International Studies working paper, available at 
http://web.mit.edu/cis/petp_wp.html.  
 
NAPAP 1981, “National Acid Precipitation Assessment Plan,” Washington, DC: 
Interagency Task Force on Acid Precipitation.  
 
NAPAP 1982, “Annual report: National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program,” 
Washington, DC: National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program.  
 
NAPAP 1984, “Annual report: Interagency Task Force on Acid Precipitation,” Washington, 
DC: Executive Office of the President Publications.  
 
60 
Anticipation and Adaptation in U.S. Air Quality Policy 
NAPAP 1989, “Annual report: National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program,” 
Washington, DC: National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program.  
 
NAPAP 1991, “1990 Integrated Assessment,” Washington, DC: National Acid Precipitation 
Assessment Program.  
 
NAPAP 1998, “Biennial Report to Congress: An Integrated Assessment,” Washington, DC: 
National Science and Technology Council Committee on Environment and Natural 
Resources 
 
NAAQS PRW 2006, U.S. EPA, “Review of the Process for Setting National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards,” Offices of Air and Radiation and Research and Development 
 
Portney, P., 1990 “Policy Watch: Economics and the Clean Air Acti”, J. of Econ. Persp., 4(4). 
 
Pope, C. A. III, M. J. Thun, M. M. Namboodiri, D. W. Dockery, J. S. Evans, F. E. Speizer, 
and C. W. Heath, Jr.,  1995.  "Particulate Air Pollution as a Predictor of Mortality in a 
Prospective Study of U.S. Adults," American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, 151, 
pp. 669-674.  
 
Powell, M.R., 1999, Science at the EPA: Information in the Regulatory Process, Resource for the 
Future Press, July. 
 
Rubin, E.S., L.B. Lave, and M.G. Morgan, 1992 “Keeping climate research relevant,” Issues 
Sci. Technol. VIII(2): 47–55. 
  61 

Background Papers for TAUC Workshop, Washington, DC, 10-11 October 2006 
10. Appendix A: PM10 versus alternative size-specific indicators in 
1987 in the US 
In its 1982 Staff Paper, the EPA identified two approaches to selecting a size fraction for the 
PM indicator: 1) select size divisions based on how and where particles of certain sizes 
typically deposit in the human respiratory tract; and, 2) choose the size divisions based on 
typical atmospheric size distributions (1982 SP pgs. 67-8). This decision is ultimately the 
decision of whether to maintain the choice of a PM10 indicator as an option or to restrict the 
indicator to lie somewhere between particles with diameters less than 3 to 1 µm (PM1 to 
PM3, including PM2.5 as an option).  
They decide to focus more heavily on the first approach to determine the indicator. 
To justify this decision, the Staff Paper discusses the merits of each approach and the 
uncertainties associated with each. In doing so, the Staff Paper emphasizes the uncertainties 
associated with the second, rejected, approach.   
The second approach of using the cut-point of the bimodal distribution of PM in the 
atmosphere would have entailed treating fine particles – those with diameter less than 2.5 or 
3 µm – and larger modes of PM separately. This would have meant selecting a cut-point of 
between 1 and 3 µm. The EPA suggested that this natural dividing line was “at least partially 
relevant” for deposition in the human respiratory tract; studies as early as 1975 (Whitby, 
1975 as cited in 1982 SP) have suggested the need to collect evidence in support of a fine 
particle standard (1982 SP pg. 68-9).  
In support of the second approach, they noted that, although few epidemiological 
studies were available that studied the relationships between fine particles and mortality or 
morbidity, the epidemiological studies that used British Smokeshade (BS) as an indicator may 
be best related to the fine particles (1982 SP pg. 68-9). This conclusion draws from a study 
reviewed in the 1982 CD that finds that the method of measuring BS most predominantly 
collected particles smaller than 7-9 µm and, of those, collected particles with diameters 
smaller than 4-5 µm most efficiently (1982 CD pg. 103 citing McFarland et al. 1982). A 
number of epidemiological studies from the late 1960s and early 1970s found an association 
between PM, measured as BS, with morbidity and mortality (see 1982 CD pgs. 82-105 for a 
summary citing Martin and Bradley, 1960; Martin, 1964; Mazumdar et al., 1981; Lawther, 
1958; Lawther et al., 1970).  
After referencing these indications of the potential impact of fine particles on health 
in the 1982 SP, the EPA then lists seven uncertainties that complicate using the dividing line 
of PM’s bimodal distribution as a cut-point for the PM indicator. Two of these uncertainties 
involve the fact that there is not a sharp dividing line between the fine and course PM 
fractions. They also note that fine and coarse particles both deposit in the tracheobronchial 
and alveolar regions and that size alone might not determine the health effects of the 
deposition of these particles; their chemical composition might be more important (1982 SP 
pg. 69).  
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The EPA emphasizes the uncertainties surrounding the option of choosing an 
indicator that focuses on fine PM. Several of the seven stated, and bulleted, uncertainties 
should logically be combined into only one uncertainty. For example, as the third uncertainty 
they state: “Although the two modes have differing origins and chemistries, each is 
chemically heterogeneous.” It is striking that this point alone is not an uncertainty but a fact 
widely recognized at the time. The same is true for the fourth uncertainty: “The respiratory 
tract in effect alters the ambient distribution, with a mixture of fine and coarse particles 
being deposited in the tracheobronchial and alveolar regions.” The fifth listed uncertainty is 
then: “The mixing of modes in the respiratory tract and the heterogeneity within each mode 
blur the distinction between the modes in terms of health effects. For example, … it is not 
clear that 1 µm carbon particles are more likely to result in pneumoconiosis than 4 µm silica 
particles” (1982 SP pg. 69).  While the latter of these three ‘uncertainties’ is a convincing 
point, the three of these together logically combine to make one point, not three.  
It is because of these seven stated uncertainties that the EPA chose to base its 
selection of an indicator primarily on where the different size fractions are deposited in the 
respiratory tract rather than on the bimodal distribution (1982 SP pg. 72). They were 
uncomfortable with the idea of using an indicator based on the size distribution, like PM2.5 or 
PM3, because it would ignore the larger particles between about 2.5 µm and 10 µm in 
diameter that also deposit in the respiratory tract. While the EPA highlighted the 
uncertainties surrounding the option of using the bimodal distribution to select a PM 
indicator, they did not stress any uncertainties associated with the deposition-based 
approach.  
It may be inconsequential in a document that is a little-read as the Staff Paper, but 
this observation begs the question of whether the EPA stressed the uncertainty that worked 
toward the favored choice of the indicator for PM. A previous study of the 1979 to 1987 PM 
NAAQS review found through interviews that the EPA avoided a PM2.5 standard during this 
review because they did not want to institute a regulatory program on SO2 emissions through 
a “back-door” mechanism like the PM NAAQS (Powell 1999 pg. 242 reference to endnote 
5, pg. 263). The EPA’s choice of the approach to choosing the PM indicator based on where 
the different size fractions deposit in the respiratory tract is, however, consistent with the 
EPA’s mandate to set health-based standards. 
During the public comment period for the 1987 proposed rule to use PM10 as the 
indicator, the EPA received some comments suggesting that PM2.5 was a more appropriate 
indicator because smaller particles posed greatest health concern (52 FR 24634, July 1, 1987).  
The EPA further explained the reasoning behind rejecting the PM2.5 standard in its response 
to these comments. The logic is used is very similar to that in the SP. First, the 2.5 µm 
marker separates the fine and coarse fractions of PM that have different chemical and 
physical properties and sources. The EPA rejected the PM2.5 indicator because of the overlap 
between the fine and course modes and because the respiratory tract sees the deposition of a 
mixture of fine and coarse mode PM in both the tracheobronchial and alveolar regions: “The 
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mixing of these size fractions in the respiratory tract and the heterogeneity within each 
fraction therefore blurs the distinction between the fractions in terms of health effects” (52 
FR 24634, July 1, 1987). Second, coarse dust is associated with various health problems: they 
believed that not all health effects come from the fine fraction alone. Also, a fine PM 
standard not warranted in addition to the PM10 standard because 1) fine PM is 40 to 70% of 
PM10 so PM10 standard does cover fine PM to some extent, 2) epidemiological studies do not 
separate the effects of fine and coarse fractions so there is not a basis for a PM2.5 standard; 
and 3) it may be more “appropriate to consider the addition of chemical-specific (e.g., acid 
aerosols) standards rather than a fine particle standard in future primary standard revision” 
(52 FR 24634, July 1, 1987). 
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11. Appendix B: Comparison of Stringency of US and EU PM 
Standards 
 
 
Kate Martin1, Hans Visser2 and Arthur Petersen2
1 Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 
USA 
2 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Bilthoven, The Netherlands 
 
 
This short piece compares the stringency of the United States air quality standards for 
particulate matter (PM) to the stringency of the PM standards in the European Union using 
data from air quality monitors in the United States and the Netherlands. According to The 
Pacific Research Institute (Hayward and Stowers 2004), ‘it is difficult to judge whether the 
U.S. or the E.U. has the tougher air quality standard’ since head-to-head comparisons of 
these norms are impossible. By using real data, a comparison is possible, however. In this 
document, the empirical data from the US is used to compare the number of monitoring 
stations violating annual and 24-hour standards from both sides of the ocean.63 Data from 
various monitors across the United States from 2002 through 2005 were used for these 
calculations.64 The empirical data from the Netherlands (period 1992 through 2004) is used 
to both compare the US and EU 24-hour standards to the EU annual standard and compare 
both unions’ annual standards.65
 
Particulate matter air quality standards in the United States 
There are currently three US particulate matter standards for air quality. As of September 
21st, 2006 air quality in an area will meet the PM air quality standards under the following 
conditions:66
 
1) 24-hour PM10 standard: met when the 3-year average of the annual 99th percentile 
values for PM10 at each monitoring site is less than or equal to 150 µg/m3.  
2) Annual PM2.5 standard: met when the 3-year average of the spatially averaged 
annual mean PM2.5 concentrations (among designated monitors67) is less than or 
equal to 15 µg/m3.  
                                                 
63 Although the averaging times for the standards differ, we have made some pragmatic choices in order to make the 
comparison possible. 
64 EPA’s “Air Data” at http://www.epa.gov/oar/data/ and from the EPA’s “Air Quality System” at 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/airs/airsaqs/detaildata/downloadaqsdata.htm last viewed October 1, 2006. 
65 The Dutch data derive from the national air quality monitoring network (Landelijk Meetnet Luchtkwaliteit, LML) 
operated by the Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). Website (with 
downloadable data): http://www.rivm.nl/milieukwaliteit/lucht (in Dutch). 
66 40 CFR Part 50 
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3) 24-hour PM2.5 standard: met when the 3-year average of the annual 98th percentile 
values for PM2.5 at each monitoring site is less than or equal to 35 µg/m3.  
 
Prior to this recent decision, the PM air quality standards in the US also included an annual 
PM10 standard that was met when the 3-year average of the annual mean PM10 
concentrations at each monitoring site were less than or equal to 50 µg/m3. The EPA’s 2006 
decision also lowered the 24-hour PM2.5 standard from 65 µg/m3. 
 
Particulate matter air quality standards in the European Union 
The air quality standards in the EU include 
 
1) Annual PM10 standard: met when the annual average PM10 value is less than 40 
µg/m3.  
2) 24-hour PM10 standard: met when the 24-hour average values of PM10 exceed 50 
µg/m3 fewer than 36 times. 
3) Proposed PM2.5 standard: met when the annual average PM2.5 value is less than 25 
µg/m3. 
 
The US annual PM2.5 standard of 15 µg/m3 is clearly more stringent than the proposed EU 
standard of 25 µg/m3 even with three-year and spatial averaging. The PM10 standards are 
more difficult to compare without data. Below we present two original comparison exercises 
based on US and Dutch data. 
 
Comparison of PM10 standards, part I: Exceedences at the monitoring site level in the United States in 
2005 
We here first present the results of the comparison exercise based on the US data. 
Calculation of compliance with the US standards requires three years of data for all standards 
(to calculate compliance in 2005, data from 2002 through 2005 are needed). The similar 
calculations for the EU standards only require data from the year in question. These 
calculations are all for compliance in 2005. For a set of 989 monitoring sites across the US, 
table 1 and figures 1 and 2 below summarize the comparison results.  
 
U.S. 24-hour EU 24-hour U.S. Annual EU Annual
49 47 18 54
Number of exceedences for 2005
 
 
Table 1 
Number of US monitoring sites that did not meet the standards in 2005. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
67 Designated monitors are specifically designated for spatial averaging as allowed under 40 CFR Part 58. 
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From table 1 we can conclude that the EU and US 24-hour PM10 standards are of 
similar stringency and that the EU annual standard is definitely more stringent than the – 
now defunct – annual standard for PM10 in the United States.  
 Figure 1 shows us that the exceedences of the two 24-hour standards are not well 
correlated. Of the 49 sites that did not meet the US 24-hour PM10 standard and the 47 that 
did not meet the EU standard, only 20 did not meet both. 
 Figure 2 gives an indication of the significant year-to-year variability in the annual 
mean PM10 concentration for each monitoring station. For instance, several monitors that 
were in compliance with EU norms in 2005, were not in compliance with US norms over the 
2002–2005 averaged period.  
 
 
Figure 1 
Exceedence of US and EU 24-hour standards for each US site in 2005. For each site, the 
number of days the US standard of 150 µg/m3 is exceeded (vertical axis; calculation based on a 
running average) and the number of days the EU standard of 50 µg/m3 is exceeded (horizontal 
axis) are shown. Note that 913 of the US sites do not show an exceedance of any of both 24-
hour standards. All those sites are represented by the single dot in the origin. [read “sites” for 
“days” in the figure] 
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Figure 2 
Exceedence of US and EU annual standards for each US site in 2005. For each site, the 3-year 
averaged annual mean (vertical axis) and the 2005 annual mean (horizontal axis) are shown. 
[read “sites” for “days” in the figure] 
 
Comparison of PM10 standards, part II: Exceedences based on spatially averaged data from the Netherlands 
1992–2004 
In the second comparison exercise, daily values of PM10 over the period 1992 through 2004 
were used from 18 stations distributed over the Netherlands. All data for January 1st were 
removed because of the high concentrations due to fireworks. This effect is not what we are 
specifically interested in. Of the 18 stations, nine are rural background, four are urban 
background and five are urban street stations. The results are shown in figures 3, 4 and 5. 
From figure 3 we can conclude that more exceedences occurred of the 24-hour EU 
standard than of the annual EU standard. The assumption behind the 1999 Daughter 
Directive that introduced both standards was that the two limit values for PM10 were 
equivalent; based on the knowledge at that time they were they thought to be equally 
‘stringent’. In practice, this has turned out not to be the case. The limit value for the 24-hour 
average is more ‘stringent’ than that for the annual average concentration (limit of 40 
μg/m3). The EU daily norm is equivalent to a yearly average limit of about 31 μg/m3. What 
is remarkable in this figure is that the spread around the green trend line is small. This means 
that in Netherlands one norm would suffice instead of two. This can either be a daily or an 
annual average norm. A choice could be: an annual average PM10 norm of 31 μg/m3, which 
– coincidentally – is near the norm of 33 μg/m3 proposed by the European Parliament on 
September 26, 2006.  
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Figure 3 
PM10 annual means (horizontal axis) and number of daily crossing of EU norm of 50 μg/m3 
(vertical axis) for 18 stations distributed over the Netherlands over the period 1992–2004. The 
EU daily and annual thresholds are indicated by red lines. Each dot shows an annual mean for a 
particular year averaged of all stations of the same type (rural background: nine stations; urban 
background: four stations; and urban streets: five stations). 
 
Folkert et al. (2005, 34) mention that the proposed concentration cap of 25 µg/m3 
for PM2.5 is derived from the annual averaged limit value for PM10 of 40 µg/m3 using a factor 
0.6. Since the ratio of PM2.5/PM10 is estimated to be about 0.75 (0.6–0.85) in the 
Netherlands, the PM2.5 concentration cap is stricter than the PM10 annual limit value and 
matches a yearly averaged PM10 concentration of about 33 µg/m3. Thus the daily limit value 
for PM10 of about 30 μg/m3 will remain the strictest limit. This may become different if the 
PM2.5 standards of 20 μg/m3 proposed by the European Parliament on September 26, 2006 
is endorsed. 
 In figure 4, the US daily norm is compared to the EU annual norm. It appears that 
the US daily norm is approximately equivalent to an annual average norm of 42 μg/m3. The 
US daily norm is thus somewhat less stringent than the EU annual average norm. Still, the 
scatter around the green line is large. Thus setting a daily norm is really different from setting 
an annual average norm. 
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Figure 4 
PM10 annual means (horizontal axis) and number of daily crossing of US norm of 150 μg/m3 for 18 
stations distributed over the Netherlands over the period 1992-2004. The EU annual and the US 
daily threshold are indicated by red lines. For the definition of the dots, see figure 3. 
  
 Finally, in figure 5, as in figure 2, the US and EU annual limits are compared. This 
figure shows that 50 microgram smoothed over 3 years does never occur in the Netherlands. 
Conversion of the US norm into a non-smoothed threshold (commensurable to the EU 
annual average measure) is thus unreliable (it is risky to extrapolate the EU annual average 
measure) is thus unreliable (it is risky to extrapolate the green line, a flexible trend estimate). 
But at least it may be concluded from figure 5 that the EU norm is stricter. This 
corroborates the results for the US data. 
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Figure 5 
PM10 annual means according to the EU definition (horizontal axis) and the US definition (vertical 
axis) for 18 stations distributed over the Netherlands over the period 1992-2004. The EU and US 
annual thresholds are indicated by red lines. For the definition of the dots see figure 3. 
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